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 Abstract 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have become a highly popular form of corporate 
development. The research in the M&A field is extensive, but there is a lack of research 
regarding how external relations are affected when the M&As do not work out as planned, 
and whether competitors can win if the M&A fails. This study explores whether and how an 
M&A that struggles affects its external relations. The study was conducted using a case study 
of a well-known, struggling Norwegian M&A: SAS Braathens, and the external relations 
examined were the competitors, the customers, and the media.     
 
The main finding of this paper shows that an M&A that struggles can affect its external 
relations negatively. To what degree the external relations will be affected, depends on the 
change in market structure and the market share of the M&A, how differentiated the products 
in the industry are, existing substitutes, and if the struggling affects the public or not. Further, 
this paper finds that the main reasons for SAS Braathens struggle can be traced back to poor 
communication and the management.   
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 1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Mergers & Acquisitions 
The phenomenon of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) has developed over the last 30 years 
and it has become a highly popular form of corporate development to create diversity and 
growth (Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006; Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988, Pablo, 1994). In 
2004, there were 30,000 acquisitions completed around the world, which equates to one 
transaction every 18 minutes (Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006). Martin Sikora (2006) 
explains the increasing numbers of M&As with factors such as low inflation, deregulation and 
a rising stock market. He also argues that we are in the middle of an M&A boom, and that the 
signs are pointing towards an increase in 2007. The increase in M&As is resulting in more 
research being conducted, but even more research is needed since there is a high failure rate 
of M&As. Managers of acquiring firm’s report that 44% of their acquisitions are not living up 
to the original objectives, and about 70% of all mergers and acquisitions are reported as 
failures (Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006; Pablo, 1994; Peng, 2006).   
 
With the deregulation of the aviation industry, the industry has seen more mergers between 
different airline companies. With the announcement in 2001 that the Scandinavian Airlines 
System (SAS) was to acquire the Norwegian national air carrier Braathens, the industry saw a 
sign of further consolidation within the European airline market, which has tended to focus on 
M&As on the national level (Morrocco, 2001). In the US, for example, M&As between large 
airlines have experienced a bad record. The main reasons for this are that labor issues, and 
seniority integration, cause stress (Weisenthal & Fernando, 2006).   
 
“Most airline employees live and die by their seniority position. For instance, the most senior 
pilot gets his/her pick of available assignments, the second highest picks second, down the 
line. So how the two seniority lists are integrated is a very big issue” (Weisenthal & 
Fernando, 2006).  
 
They later explain that the Airline Pilots Association has never been involved in a merger that 
has not ended up with them being sued by one side or the other. And in a merger, all unions 
go through some sort of seniority integration they must fight over.    
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 1.2 Presentation of the problem 
Due to the recent increase in M&As around the world, we thought it could be interesting to 
focus our own research on this timely issue. We have chosen to focus our study on the merger 
between SAS and Braathens in 2004, which has been one of the largest and most discussed 
M&As in recent years in Norway. As a direct result of significant government influence, the 
monopolistic situation in Norway, and other factors, the merger has gained a lot of public 
attention, not only from the political and legal perspectives, but also from the general public, 
as well.  It can be discussed whether this transaction was a merger or an acquisition, however, 
for our purposes we will define this event as a merger. In 2001, Braathens was acquired by the 
SAS Group, meaning they were already a part of SAS when SAS Norway and Braathens 
became one company in 2004.  
 
An M&A can create valuable synergies if it succeeds, but can also create negative publicity if 
it does not work out as planned. There are several strategic factors that determine if the M&A 
will be a success of not, two of them are the management and the organizational cultures 
involved (more are discussed in the theory chapter). A successful M&A can create synergies 
that can become an economic gain for the new firm (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993), but if 
the merging firms do not take strategic factors into consideration, the M&A can end in 
disaster. It can be a major challenge for the management to bring together two companies that 
probably differ in both management style and organizational culture. A common culture in the 
new firm may result in that everybody strives towards the same goal, and the firm becomes 
easier to manage.  
 
There has been a lot of research conducted about M&As, ranging from why it is a popular 
corporate development strategy, to different factors behind success, to who wins and who 
loses in the respective firms if the M&A does not work out. One topic that has not received 
that much research concerns how external relations are affected when the M&As do not work 
out as planned, and whether competitors can win if the M&A fails. When an M&A struggles 
or fails, it might not only affect the two companies involved, it might also, in different ways, 
affect their external relations. For example, the customers might be unsatisfied if the 
struggling affects the service they are use to, and maybe the competitors can gain market 
shares etcetera from the struggling M&A. Theses issues, how the external relations can be 
affected and why, are something we will look at and examine in this thesis.    
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 1.3 The Research question 
Because of the general lack, and gap, in the research about the external relations in M&As, we 
believed this could be interesting area of focus for our study, and have decided upon the 
following research question: 
 
How are external relations affected when a merger and acquisition is struggling? 
- A case study of SAS Braathens 
 
To be able to answer this question we will examine how the integration of SAS and Braathens 
was implemented and how the employees reacted, beginning from the day the merger became 
public until today, and how this reaction has affected external relations. As said before, 
Braathens was acquired by the SAS Group in 2001. At first they were a subsidiary with 
autonomy, and then in 2004 Braathens and SAS Norway merged into one company, SAS 
Braathens. We will concentrate our studies on the merger itself, and when the two companies 
started to work together as one company.  
 
This paper will be based on a case study of SAS Braathens with particular focus on the 
reasons for why the M&A is struggling. By looking at the case study and relevant theories, 
conclusions will be drawn as to how the external relations are affected. The external relations 
evaluated will be the competitors with a focus on Norwegian Air Shuttle, customers and the 
media. The case study will be based on information from the company and interviews with 
pilots. The pilots’ point of view was chosen because they are considered a vital resource in the 
organization, and it is within this group that several high profile conflicts have occurred. 
 
1.4 Purpose of the question 
There are some factors that have to be taken into consideration when choosing a research 
question. The question must, from a purely practical standpoint, be possible to carry out and it 
should be relevant (Jacobsen, 2002). The research question in this paper could be of interest 
for SAS Braathens itself, for academicians, and for the business world and society.  
 
For SAS Braathens, it could be of interest for the company to understand the pilots’ point of 
view of what has happened during the integration process, and also to gain a picture of how 
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 the integration has progressed so far. They can also learn how the process has affected 
external relations, and what they need to do to improve this, and what they should think about 
in their further integration.  
     
Since M&As are increasing around the world, this paper might contribute to the research 
concerning this phenomenon. As stated before, there is a lot of research conducted about 
M&As, but with the different angle of approach of this paper it might contribute to further 
information about how the external relations can be affected by looking at a real case.  
 
For the business world and society, this paper can be relevant in illustrating what can go 
wrong in an M&A. For other companies that want to go through with an M&A, this paper can 
give them information about what can go wrong, and how the relations are affected. For 
society, especially in Norway, it is of interest since SAS Braathens is the largest airline 
company in the country, and they have the power to affect the Norwegian infrastructure. 
When a strike breaks out the whole society is affected, and this is particularly true because of 
the geography of Norway and the Norwegian infrastructure, with long distances between 
cities, and mountainous terrain that makes other means of travel difficult. For this reason, the 
public needs more openness about what is happening in SAS Braathens and the SAS Group, 
to know how they are handling the internal conflicts.          
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 2.0 Background 
2.1 The Aviation Industry 
One definition of aviation is “the design, manufacture, use, or operation of aircraft - in which 
the term aircraft refers to any vehicle capable of flight” (GlobalAircraft.org, "History of 
Aviation", 2007). The first machine powered flight occurred on the 17th of December 1903, 
by the Wright brothers, and lasted for 12 seconds. After this event, the development of the 
aircraft industry has been enormous (GlobalAircraft.org, 2007). In the late 1950s, the first 
commercial jet aircraft took to the skies and the face of aviation was changed forever. Several 
organizations were established among others the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), which is the main governing body for all civil aviation and the Organization for the 
Safety of Air Navigation in Europe (EUROCONTROL), with the purpose to maintain safety 
in the European air traffic management (Luftfart, 2007; EUROCONTROL, 2007).     
 
The aviation industry operates in a fragile economic environment and is in permanent turmoil. 
During the last 16 years the industry’s combined losses adds up to $51 billion (Sparaco, 
2005). Air France Chairman/CEO Jean-Cyril Spinetta, who also was the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) president for 2004-05, says that “airlines are not an endangered 
species, but we destroy lots of shareholder value” (Sparaco, p. 52, 2005). One explanation for 
the turmoil in the industry is excess capacity, resulting in that airline companies cannot charge 
prices that would make economic sense. Both Spinetta and Ryan air CEO Michael O'Leary 
say that excess capacity, and unrealistic competitive practices, such as cutthroat pricing, "will 
end in a bloodbath" (Sparaco, p. 52, 2005).   
 
2.1.1 Deregulation 
The aviation industry has been known for being highly regulated by national governments, 
mainly to protect national airlines from foreign competitors. At both domestic and 
international levels, there has been extensive regulation, including: regulated entry, capacity, 
pricing, and network structure in domestic markets, while the international market has been 
dominated by bilateral agreements between national governments (Peeters et al., 2001). 
 
After the economic crisis in the 1930s’, free markets were mistrusted and associated with risk 
  11
 and destructive competition (Peeters et al., 2001). But as time passed, government regulations 
appeared to have negative effects on the efficiency in the airline industry resulting in that 
consumers did not get what they needed, and had to pay inflated prices. The deregulation of 
the industry has shown to in general be beneficial for the society. The US market was 
deregulated in 1978, leading to turmoil with new entries and price competition (Salvanes et 
al., 2003). Another outcome of deregulation in the US was that more mergers and takeovers 
took place (Gong & Firth, 2006).  
 
While deregulation in the US was introduced quite drastically, the European deregulation was 
approached gradually. During the time span between 1984 and 1997, various intra-European 
Union (EU) traffic restrictions were abolished, and in 1994, the Norwegian market was 
deregulated (Peeters et al., 2001; Strandenes, 2002). A main difference between the US 
deregulation and the European deregulation was the already existing hub-and-spoke network 
in Europe, since the national airlines already used the national airports as their hubs. The 
question in Europe was if the existing network would be replaced with a concentrated hub-
and-spoke network, with main hubs such as London, Frankfurt and Paris, because of the 
concentration tendency in the industry (Peeters et al., 2001). 
 
With deregulation, there also occurred some economic effects. One consequence of 
deregulation was the increase of competition. When the entry restrictions were removed, there 
was an immediate boom of new entrants, especially with companies offering cheap tickets. A 
later trend was the emergence of global alliances, such as Star Alliance. Big airlines started to 
cooperate and coordinate their services, leading to an expansion of destinations. In Europe, 
prices have also been affected by the deregulation in form of a decrease. The decrease in 
prices has, in turn, led to a higher demand and impact on the frequencies of flights. A final 
consequence of the deregulation, mentioned here, is the network structure. With fewer 
restrictions, hubs attract more transfer passengers, and with the global alliances, airlines are 
less dependent on one particular airport (Peeters et al., 2001).                   
 
2.1.2 Low price airlines 
Since the deregulation, several low-cost airlines have been established, especially in Europe, 
with more than 50 low-cost carriers operating today. They have expanded rapidly, and most 
of them are making a profit (Sparaco, 2005).  
  12
 The low-cost airlines are increasing the competition in an already competitive industry. In 
1998, the Norwegian based low-cost airline Color Air was established. Before 1998, SAS and 
Braathens dominated the domestic air industry, but with the opening of the new airport, 
Gardermoen in Oslo, it became freer capacity in the Norwegian net. Color Air established and 
increased the competition in the Norwegian market. They were offering low fares with great 
freedom. There were no longer any restrictions on how many nights or days you had to spend 
away, and the prices were the same if you booked a single ticket or a return ticket. However, 
Color Air did not survive for a long time, after 14 months the company went into bankruptcy. 
As an answer to Color Air, SAS and Braathens pressed down their prices and increased their 
capacity, and in the end the competition about market shares became too great and Color Air 
crashed. Another reason for the bankruptcy was the bonus programs SAS and Braathens had. 
Because of the bonus programs, Color Air did not have a chance to attract the business 
people, which were the most frequent flyers in Norway (Strandenes, 2002). After a 
government intervention, the bonus programs were abandon on the 1st of August 2002, and 
are not longer allowed in the domestic air traffic (Denstadli et al., 2006).              
 
2.1.3 The 9/11 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks had a great impact on the airline industry. The attacks resulted in a 
short-term shutdown of the industry, taking away the airline companies most important 
resource: the cash flow. Airlines such as Northwest Airlines and US Airways were forced into 
bankruptcy protection, but later managed to emerge in leaner forms (Aboulafia, 2006). 
Another impact of the attacks was the decline in passengers; some people did not want to fly 
anymore (Northwest Airlines, 2001). The US air travel market was the one suffering the most, 
even if the European market also was hit hard, it did not generally suffer a widespread fear of 
flying (Sparaco, 2005). The fear of flying was devastating for the industry, which relays on 
growth increase, because it lost several years of traffic growth. Five years after the event, the 
airline industry is still suffering, especially the US. Richard Aboulafia, (2006), an aviation 
analyst for Teal Group, says that to overcome the problems there has to be some restructuring 
and M&As to reduce the numbers of players. However, it can be tough to carry out an M&A 
in the airline industry, since the companies have different business practices and they have a 
workforce that has seniority as a way of life. An M&A often ends with shrinkage and that is 
not something popular (Aboulafia, 2006).         
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 2.1.4 SARS 
Another factor that has influenced the aviation industry in recent years is the outbreak of 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), which was first reported in Asia in February 
2003. The SARS virus was unknown before the break out, and the source of infection was 
diffuse. The primary mode of transmission was through person-to-person, it is now shown 
that the infection is not airborne, it is only through close contact to an infected person, people 
can get infected. In March 2003, the World Health Organization (WHO) advised the SARS-
affected countries with travel restrictions. Still, potential SARS-patients traveled by air 
internationally and spread the disease globally (Breugelmans et al., 2004).  
 
The year of 2002 was one of the worst years in the aviation industry because of war threats, 
terror threats, recession, profitability problems, and restructuring in the industry. The 
following year, 2003 was supposed to be an up swing for the aviation industry, since the Iraq 
war ended (Fröberg, 2003). But the outbreak of SARS created bigger problems for the 
industry than the war and 9/11 did (Essenberg, 2003). The fear of being infected created a 
common concern about the health and a global insecurity (Fröberg, 2003). Airline companies 
were canceling flights to Asia and people in general became afraid of getting infected and the 
industry declined.           
 
2.1.5 Oil prices 
During the past couple of years, oil prices have increased significantly (See appendix 1) 
(Energy Information Administration, 2007). Increasing oil prices around the world are 
affecting the aviation industry, since fuel is the second largest expense after labor. Airline 
companies, which already are under pressure because of increased competition, overcapacity 
and lower yields, now also face higher costs because of the increase of oil prices (Kuhlman, 
2005). To counteract, they have to charge higher ticket prices, reduce the cost, increase yields 
and improve efficiency (Concil, 2005).  
 
The increase in oil prices may lead to higher fares and to a decrease in consumers’ disposable 
income, resulting in that it will be relative more expensive fly. This in its turn can lead to 
fewer customers, a decrease in demand. But on the other hand, if the airline companies do not 
take any action, they will face higher costs and risk a deficit. The higher oil prices can also 
reduce the competitive advantage that the low cost airlines are having. In the long run, if the 
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 prices continue to rise the demand for flying can be destroyed and several airlines will go out 
of business. In this worst-case scenario, it will only be the rich and the government business 
that will be able to fly, and the world integration will slow down (Kuhlman, 2005). 
      
2.2 SAS Group 
In the end of the 1930s, the government owned airlines from Sweden, Denmark, and Norway 
were having the idea of cooperation of transatlantic air service. But with the outbreak of the 
Second World War, the idea was abandoned. At the end of the war, Sweden wanted to buy 
airlines from the US, and to be able to get around the political sensitivity, a privately owned 
company was formed. After the end of the war, in August 1946, this privately owned 
company, together with the Danish and Norwegian airline companies, made reality of the old 
idea of cooperation, and SAS was established. On the 17th of September the same year, the 
inaugural flight with the new SAS plane was heading from Bromma, Sweden towards New 
York. The first agreement between the countries, was concerning the transatlantic routes, 
while the respective companies independently operated all other routes. Two years later, the 
European operations were merged, and in 1951 all overseas and European units were 
combined. In the early years, many believed that the cooperation was doomed to failure since 
the countries were traditional enemies, but in 1951 the consortium was finalized, and SAS 
established their first president, Per A. Norlin. The ownership was divided between the 
governments; the Danish and the Norwegian states got 2/7 shares each while the Swedish 
state got 3/7, mostly because of the higher capital assets. SAS was later seen as a unique 
example of Scandinavian cooperation (SAS Group, 2007).  
 
During the first 14 years, SAS was only dedicated in the airlines segment, and development in 
that segment. Then, in 1960, the first SAS hotel was opened; SAS Royal was located in the 
center of Copenhagen. A year later a new subsidiary was open in Copenhagen, this time SAS 
Catering, who was in charge of all catering activities. In 1980, SAS opened their first hotel 
outside of Scandinavia in Kuwait, and business class was introduced on the routes to North 
America. The SAS group appointed Jan Carlzon as president in 1981. Mr. Carlzon wanted to 
make SAS more customer-oriented by offering more services, and his famous leadership 
made SAS a big player in the world market and in 1984, SAS was named the “Airline of the 
Year” (SAS Group, 2007). 
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 After Jan Carlzon, Jan Stenberg was appointed president for the SAS group, in 1994. He 
emphasized the need to concentrate on SAS’s core business, and sold off several non-airline 
subsidiaries. During the 1990s, SAS instead acquired other airline companies, such as 
Spanair, from Spain, and Widerøe, from Norway, and founded new individually branded 
subsidiaries, such as Air Baltic, from the Baltic countries, and Blue 1, from Finland. In 1997, 
SAS, Lufthansa, United Airlines, Air Canada, THAI and Varig founded Star Alliance. Today 
Star Alliance consists of 18 members, operating in 152 countries with 850 destinations (SAS 
Group, 2007).  
 
2001 was a tough year for SAS, both the terrorist attacks, and the aircraft accident at Linate 
airport in Milan, were contributing factors. During 2003, SAS was trying to achieve cost 
reductions and greater efficiency by dividing up the company into regional bases in Sweden, 
Denmark and Norway. In 2004, SAS was divided into independent airlines in Scandinavia 
with one separate airline operating intercontinental, yet all the employees were still employed 
by the SAS Group. The SAS Commuter was also integrated into respective national divisions 
(See organizational chart in appendix 2) (SAS Group, 2007). Today, the SAS Group is the 
biggest listed airline company in the Nordic countries, with over 32,000 employees all over 
world.                  
 
2.3 Braathens 
Braathens SAFE A/S was established in 1946, SAFE was short for South-American & Far 
East Air transport (the name was changed to only Braathens in 1997). The ship owner, Ludvig 
Braathens founded Braathens, with the vision to put wings on the ships. The company started 
out as a charter company with its first route between Oslo and Hong Kong in 1947, but saw 
relatively soon the need for regular flights. At this time, Det Norske Luftfartsselskap (DNL), 
later SAS, had a monopoly on international flights from Norway, since it was majority owned 
by the government. If DNL not was interested in a special route, other companies could apply 
for operating that route, which was what Braathens did when they, in 1949, received the 
concession to Hong Kong. They were allowed to fly this route until 1954, when the right 
passed over to SAS. When SAS established in 1951, they were given all the rights to 
international flights from Scandinavia. This resulting in Braathens only being allowed to 
conduct charter operations outside of Norway after the concession to Hong Kong expired 
(Tjomsland & Wilsberg, 1995).  
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 SAS also had a monopoly on flights within Norway, but as with the international flights other 
companies were allowed to apply for concessions. In 1952, Braathens was given the 
concession for the route Oslo, Tønsberg and Stavanger. In following years, Braathens tried to 
get concession for other routes but failed, as SAS was given most of the routes. But in 1956, 
the Norwegian government decided to rationalize the concession process. Braathens received 
a five-year concession on the routes between Oslo and Stavanger, and Oslo and Trondheim, 
and the following years they were given even more routes. Because of the new concession 
process, Braathens and SAS could compete on a relatively friendly basis in the domestic 
market, trying to steal new market shares from each other, when a new route was opened 
(Tjomsland & Wilsberg, 1995; Olsen, 1974). 
 
In 1961, Braathens decided to expand by opening charter flights to the Mediterranean. With a 
steady expansion, both domestically and internationally, Braathens had to invest in their 
ground service buildings at Sola, in Stavanger, and buy a new hanger in 1963 (Tjomsland & 
Wilsberg, 1995; Olsen, 1974).  
 
In 1994, the Norwegian market was deregulated, anyone who wanted to, was now allowed to 
operate any domestic and international route in and from Norway. Four years after the 
deregulation, in 1998, the new national airport, Gardermoen was opened. The deregulation 
and Gardermoen led to increased competition in the Norwegian market, and low cost airlines, 
such as Color Air, were founded. With the increased competition, a price war broke out in 
Norway, Color Air pressed the prices down, and the established companies had to follow. 
After 14 months, Color Air went bankrupt, while Braathens and SAS survived, but with 
severe consequences for Braathens. After a failed Best & Back marketing strategy, the price 
war, and the decline in the aviation industry in the beginning of the 2000s, Braathens was on 
the edge to bankruptcy when, in the spring of 2001, it was announced that SAS was going to 
acquire Braathens.   
 
2.4 SAS Braathens  
In the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, Braathens experienced major financial 
difficulties. Without the cooperation with SAS, Braathens would probably not have survived, 
if not being acquired by another airline. The Norwegian market was limited, and not big 
enough for two companies of approximately the same size. SAS’s original plan was to 
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 maintain Braathens as a separate entity and brand. SAS further said that if job reductions were 
necessary it would be through retraining and attrition. One problem SAS and Braathens faced 
was that the deal had to be approved by the Norwegian Competition Authorities (NCA), since 
the situation could be compared to a monopolistic situation. Both companies promised to, not 
increase any ticket prices for the next two years, unless any extraordinary circumstances 
occurred, and that all the destinations would be kept (Morrocco, 2001). 
 
In the first round, the NCA blocked SAS’s take-over bid for Braathens. Their concerns were 
that an acquisition would result in creation of a monopoly in the domestic market and that the 
fares would increase. SAS and Braathens argued in advanced that Braathens would go 
bankrupt if they were not acquired, but the NCA questioned this statement (N/A, 2001).  
 
In October 2001, the NCA however, approved the acquisition and Braathens was integrated as 
an autonomy subsidiary in the SAS Group. During the first year, Braathens’ airplane fleet was 
reduced with six planes and 25% of the employees had to leave. Since the SAS Group had a 
subsidiary with responsibility for all the ground services, SAS Ground Service (SGS), 
Braathens Ground Handling was not longer needed and was shut down. This resulted in a 
major reduction in Braathens employees. The legal term for when SAS acquired Braathens 
was activity transition, meaning that employees from both companies should be treated 
equally. The dismissed Braathens employees and the union referred to this without being 
successful towards the Group. Instead, the case went to the court, and when the verdict was 
announced in 2006 the former Braathens employees were the winners (SAS Group Annual 
report, 2001, 2002 & 2006). 
 
In the beginning of 2004, the merger between SAS Norway and Braathens became a reality, 
and as a consequence of the restructuring within the SAS Group, a separate national airlines 
was established in each country, and one airline responsible for the intercontinental traffic. 
The new organization was given greater independency, and the national airlines could 
compete against each other to secure efficiency. On the 20th of September 2004, SAS 
Braathens became a legal entity. From the 31st of December, the pilots and cabin personal in 
SAS Norway and Braathens were integrated into SAS Braathens under the activity transition 
rule, and two very different cultures were to become one. The intention was to bring the best 
from each company into the new entity (SAS Group Annual report, 2004).   
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 With the merger into SAS Braathens, the NCA started to evaluate their position on some 
routes. In 2006, SAS Braathens was imposed a fine on the route between Oslo and 
Haugesund, for breaking the anti-trust law, they were also given notice on a fine on the route 
between Oslo and Ålesund. SAS Braathens appealed the verdict, and in 2006, they were 
acquitted. In 2006, there was also some conflicts and strikes among the pilots and cabin 
personal that affected the company and its earnings (SAS Group Annual report, 2005 & 
2006). 
 
Today, SAS Braathens flies to 45 destinations, and are the market leader in the Norwegian 
domestic market. The company has 340 departures every day and transport about 10 million 
passengers every year. After the merger, SAS Braathens has opened 18 new international 
routes. They are operating with 58 aircrafts and have approximately 3,750 employees (SAS 
Group Annual report, 2006).              
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 3.0 Methodology 
 
In this chapter, the methodology used for writing this thesis will be presented. Which method 
that is being used to answer the research question is determined with the help of the 
formulation of the problem, the purpose, the empirical data, and the amount of time and 
resources available (Andersen, 1994).  
 
Methodology is used to determine how much the results are reflected by the research method, 
or if it is a fair picture of the reality. Therefore, good knowledge about methodology theory is 
important to be able to distinguish which results that are affected by the methodology 
explanations and which are explained by substantial explanations. The method makes us go 
through certain steps when we are conducting research; it is like a manual that has to be 
followed. It can help us to systematically ask critical questions, about the choices made and 
the consequences of those choices (Jacobsen, 2002). 
 
A common purpose of almost all empiric research is to collect knowledge about a problem 
(Jacobsen, 2002). According to James G. March (1991)1 there are two different kinds of new 
knowledge. The first one is the one called genuine new knowledge, when we discover 
something we did not know about before. This knowledge is often revolutionary in the 
meaning that it challenges existing knowledge in a field. The other knowledge March talks 
about is when someone wants to develop and re-define already existing knowledge. This one 
results in a development of something we already know. It is of importance not to expect all 
empirical research to create new knowledge, if doing so we could get stuck and it could even 
lead to that we never would gain any new knowledge. Completely new knowledge is 
unknown to us in the beginning and cannot be planned. New knowledge will always be a 
result of something we did not know in the beginning of the research (Jacobsen, 2002).  
 
All empirical data collected through research must fulfill two criteria; it must be valid and 
reliable (Gummesson, 1991). Validity means that we actually research what we want to 
research and that it is seen as relevant and can apply to not only the objects of the research but 
also to others (Cassell & Symon, 1994; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). Reliability means that the 
research has to be reliable, it must be conducted in a trust giving way, and cannot consist of 
                                                          
1 Referred to in Jacobsen, 2002 
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 several obvious mistakes (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2005; Ejvegård, 2003).  
 
There are two different strategies used within methodology to get a hold of reality, deduction 
and induction. While the deduction strategy is going from theory to empirical research, the 
induction is going the opposite way, from empirical research to theory (Miller & Brewer, 
2003). With the deduction strategy we mean that we, from the beginning, have certain 
expectations about what a problem looks like, and then we are going out to see if our 
expectations are true (Gummesson, 1991). In the induction strategy, the researcher is 
supposed to go out with a completely open mind with no expectations at all and collect all 
relevant data, and then sit down and analyze it. This is an open approach with the aim that 
nothing is going to limit the data collected. The situation just described is the ideal situation, 
but it is almost impossible to go out in the world without any expectations (Jacobsen, 2002). 
When we collected the data for this paper we tried to have an open approach as possible. This 
paper consists of an induction strategy with some elements of deduction. There is little theory 
about how the relations are affected when an M&A struggles; therefore, it is not possible to 
have a fully deductive approach. Even if we had some expectations about what the research 
would give us from before, we are trying to build up a new theory, therefore, we tried to go 
out open minded to be able to get all the relevant information.      
 
Jacobsen (2002) writes about seven phases of empirical research. This methodology chapter 
will follow his phases to be able to develop and build up the best methodology that can be 
used when conducting the research for this thesis.  
 
3.1 First phase: Development of the research question 
Every research process starts with someone interested in knowing more about a certain 
subject. The starting point in almost every empirical research is a question. The research 
question must be concrete to be able to be examined, and to be conducted from a theoretic 
level to an operative level. This phase, designing a concrete question, is one of the most 
difficult and time consuming ones in the research process. Almost everyone knows what or 
whom he or she wants to examine, and have the big picture of the theme, but to design a clear 
question can be harder. And it is the question that is most important since the question will 
clarify the upcoming research and what and how things are going to be examined (Yin, 1994; 
Jacobsen, 2002). 
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 When we have agreed upon a question, we also delimit what we are looking at. The 
delimitation is important as a whole to be able to conduct an empirical research. With the 
delimitation we decide on, not looking on some things, some things we define away (Yin, 
1994). This delimitation can be done both explicit and implicit. The author makes the explicit 
delimitation, by telling, what he will focus on and what he will not focus on. The implicit 
delimitation is made unconsciously, this because of preconceptions developed during ones 
lifetime (Jacobsen, 2002).  
 
The presentation of the problem can be separated by exploratory data analysis and 
confirmatory techniques (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2005). In the exploratory data analysis the 
problem is more like an open question, where the author wants to get a deeper understanding 
of something that he knows little about and to achieve more clarity and knowledge (Alvesson 
& Sköldberg, 1994; Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2005). If the author is using the confirmatory 
techniques, he already has a good knowledge about the problem, and theory about the 
problem does already exist. The purpose of the confirmatory technique is to examine and test 
the already known problem (Jacobsen, 2002; Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2005). There is not much 
research conducted about how relationships are affected when an M&A struggles, therefore, it 
is hard to know exactly what kind of variables to measure. This is why this paper is of the 
exploratory character, instead of the confirmatory.      
 
The presentation of the problem can also be separated by description and causation. The 
descriptive view is trying to describe and bring better insight in how a certain phenomenon 
looks (Gummesson, 1991), while the causative view is trying to explain why a phenomenon 
occurred and why something special happened, by using different variables (Ghauri & 
Grønhaug, 2005; Miller & Brewer, 2003). A descriptive problem could be to describe the 
environment within an organization while causative would be to explain why people resign 
from an organization. If using the causation method, it demands the author to follow the 
project under a longer time period (Jacobsen, 2002). This thesis is of the descriptive type, 
where the phenomenon of an M&A is described, and where we try to describe how the 
external relations can be affected if the M&A is struggling. Because this project runs over a 
relative short time period, it would be hard to make reliable conclusion if using the causation 
variables.           
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 3.2 Second phase: Choice of Research design 
After deciding on a research question the next step is to decide how to collect the information 
needed (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). This can be classified in two dimensions: extensive versus 
intensive, and descriptive versus causative. Since this paper’s research question is descriptive, 
the choice is between doing a cross section study (one situation at a given time) or a time 
series study (collect data over time to find a developing trend) (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2005; 
Jacobsen, 2002).  
 
This paper is going to be a case study of the integration between SAS and Braathens done by 
a cross section study, where the integration will be the situation examined. Case studies can 
be complicated to carry out, as it can be hard to identify one case and define what we are 
looking at, and there can be several different kinds of cases to look at (Miller & Brewer, 2003; 
Yin, 1994; Marschan-Piekkari & Welch, 2004). One common thing for all case studies is that 
they are limited in space and time (Cassell & Symon, 1994). By doing a case study of the 
integration in SAS Braathens, it will narrow down the object in space and time. Conducting a 
case study is suitable when we have an exploratory research question asking “how” or “what”, 
when we want to get a deeper understanding of a certain situation, and are not really sure 
what we are looking for, when we have little or no control over the event, and also for 
development of new theory (Yin, 1994; Marschan-Piekkari & Welch, 2004; Cassell & 
Symon, 1994). By going deeper into something specific we can find new conclusions, which 
later on can be tried in other case studies or projects (Jacobsen, 2002). Through this case 
study of SAS Braathens’ integration, the conclusions can maybe in the future be used to look 
into different M&As. 
 
The ideal research design is both extensive and intensive, which means, using many variables, 
and many units. But this is hard to carry out since it is both time consuming to collect all the 
data, and then takes long time to analyze (Jacobsen, 2002). Therefore, this paper is intensive; 
we have examined the situation in-depth, with a few units. By interviewing people that all 
have experience one event, the integration of SAS Braathens, we have got a deeper 
understanding of what happened during this integration. The purpose of the intensive 
planning was to get us the clearest picture possible of one situation or phenomenon, to get all 
the nuances and details, by using as many variables as possible.         
 
  23
 3.3 Third phase: Which data to collect 
In this phase we have to decide which kind of data to collect, numbers or words, are we using 
the quantitative - or the qualitative method (Miller & Brewer, 2003). It is often the character 
of the research question that determines the choice of which method that is going to be used, 
if having a confirmatory question, the use of quantitative approach is more suitable, and if 
having an exploratory question, the qualitative approach is more suitable (Marschan-Piekkari 
& Welch, 2004). In the quantitative approach, you transform the information collected into 
quantifiable measures used when you analyze your results, while the qualitative approach is 
more about interpret and understand the information (Miller & Brewer, 2003; Cassell & 
Symon, 1994; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). Using the quantitative method gives a narrower 
picture of the situation, whilst the qualitative gives a deeper understanding (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 1994; Jacobsen, 2002).  
 
The research in this paper is based on the qualitative approach. The research question is of the 
exploratory kind and by using the qualitative approach, which is open and flexible it can help 
us to get a more nuance picture of the integration (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2005; Cassell & 
Symon, 1994). The qualitative method also has a strong connection with the intensive 
research design; both are trying to identify the deepness and the nuances of the problem 
(Jacobsen, 2002). One negative aspect of the qualitative approach is that it is resource 
demanding, both in the data collection and in the analyze phase (Cassell & Symon, 1994). 
Doing a qualitative open research is time consuming, and since this paper has a shorter time 
frame, we do not have the capacity to examine many units, which is why the qualitative 
approach often is intensive: using few units, but several variables. 
 
We know using few respondents can become a problem, and we can come across the 
generalization problem (Gummesson, 1991; Jacobsen, 2002). But by using the same amount 
of respondents from both sides, SAS and Braathens, we have got a balanced result. And since 
the main aim with the interviews was to get information about how the integration was carried 
out, and all the respondents was a part of the integration, we do not need many respondents. 
The problem is that we just have got some few peoples own nuances, thoughts and feelings.  
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 3.4 Fourth phase: Collection of Qualitative data 
There are different ways of collecting qualitative data; there is the individual open interview, 
the group interview, observations, and documentary sources (Andersen, 1994). When 
deciding which method to choose it is important to remember the validity and reliability 
concepts. The method chosen affects the validity, since we have to be able to study what we 
sought to study. The method also affects the reliability of the data, as all the methods are 
selective in their collection of data, and because the method can affect the outcome of the 
research (Gummesson, 1991; Jacobsen, 2002).  
 
This paper is based on open individual interviews. The open interview is a good alternative 
when there are a few respondents and when it is important to hear what each respondent is 
saying and get different interpretations and nuances (Jacobsen, 2002; Denzin & Lincoln, 
1994). The interviews were conducted over the phone, since the respondents live in different 
parts of Norway, and to make it more anonymous, and notes were taken during the whole 
interview. We know that it could have been easier to analyze the calls afterwards if they have 
been recorded, but this was not done since we did not have the equipment, and since we 
thought that we could take good notes during the calls without seeming rude, writing the 
whole time. The interviews were more or less open, with just a few structured questions to 
help us get started and to make sure that we got the information needed (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 
2005, Yin, 1994).  
 
Since it is hard to get all the hard facts, what happened when during the integration, the 
interviews were complemented with documentary sources, as annual reports. Documentary 
sources can be useful when it is hard to collect primary data, when we want to know how 
someone else interpreted the situation, when to find out what others actually said or done, and 
to corroborate information from other sources (Cassell & Symon, 1994; Yin, 1994). Using 
secondary data can be devastating, if used incorrectly. The data might have been collected for 
a different purpose, and used in a different way than our intention, therefore, it is important to 
keep in mind the reliability concept, if this data is reliable for us (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2005; 
Yin, 1994).  
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 3.5 Fifth phase: How to choose respondents and units? 
It would be interesting to examine how the external relations have been affected in every 
M&A ever done, but that would be impossible for us to carry out. The researcher must narrow 
down the area to something doable, and express this in the presentation of the problem. The 
research will be valid for only the subjects examined and for the time period examined, since 
things can change (Jacobsen, 2002). For the research conducted for this paper the main unit 
examined is SAS Braathens’ integration. SAS Braathens was chosen since it was an 
interesting company, which struggled in their integration, and because of accessible data and 
contacts.  
 
The persons used as respondents for our interviews were more or less selected randomly 
among pilots in SAS Braathens. The respondents were selected by using contacts for the first 
interviews, and then we asked them for more people that they thought would be willing to be 
interviewed. We chose to talk to pilots that experienced the integration, much because they 
are a vital resource in SAS Braathens and because of limitation reasons. The pilots were able 
to give us information, not only what happened among the pilots, but also in different levels 
in the firm. As a result, this paper presents information about what happened during the 
integration from the pilots view. With respect to the confidentiality of the respondents (Ghauri 
& Grønhaug, 2005), they will just be referred to as pilot/employee in SAS and pilot/employee 
in Braathens. After we talked to four persons, two pilots from SAS and two pilots from 
Braathens, we got a good picture of the situation and the respondents more or less gave us the 
same information with some minor differences regarding their own thoughts (Jacobsen, 
2002).             
 
The secondary data selected for this research is annual reports, with written information about 
the integration process, and to some extent web pages and newspaper articles to make sure 
everything is covered. The information from the annual reports are information given to all 
the stakeholders in SAS Braathens and to the public, and is, therefore, first hand information 
and would in regard to the purpose of this paper be relevant and reliable (Cassell & Symon, 
1994). The newspaper and web pages used were published for the public, and might in some 
degree be biased (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2005), something we have taken into consideration. 
The integration of SAS and Braathens was of huge interest in Norway, since it was a big 
public company merging, and, therefore, it was possible to also get reliable information from 
  26
 these sources.  
 
3.6 Sixth phase: How to analyze the data 
When the interviews are done there are often many papers with a lot of information. To be 
able to get an overview we have to facilitate and restructure the material (Marschan-Piekkari 
& Welch, 2004). After each interview, we sat down and thought through what was said, 
looked through the notes, and if it was needed we added new notes to clarify the issue. During 
this process the quotations was also evaluated and clarified, since the interviews were 
conducted in Swedish-Norwegian, and with only notes taken, we had to translate the 
quotations and sometimes it was hard to remember the specific words they were using. But 
even if we did not get every single word the respondent was saying, we got most of it, and 
more valuable we got the meaning of it, therefore, we felt it was more appropriate using it as a 
quotation than just in text.  
 
When all the interviews were done, we read through all the answers again, and made links 
between the answers to get a better view of every situation. In regard to the interviews, we 
categorized the information to structure up the empiric chapter, while we also had the theory 
in mind. After this, we went through the categories and filled in the answers from the 
respondents. Last we went through the information from each interview again, adding some 
additional information and made sure we had not forgotten anything. 
 
3.7 Seventh phase: How good are our conclusions? 
It is of importance to be critical during the whole thesis process (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). It 
is first when all the data is collected and the conclusions are drawn, we can see how valid and 
reliable out conclusions are. To find out how valid our conclusions are we can compare our 
examination and results with the results from other researchers and we can critical review our 
findings (Marschan-Piekkari & Welch, 2004).  
 
There has not been much research about how an M&A that struggles can affect the external 
relations; therefore, it is difficult to compare our examination with someone else’s to see if it 
is valid. Because of the fact that there is limited research in this field, it is hard to say if we 
measured this phenomenon in the correct way, if we used the right variables and if it gives a 
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 truly picture of the reality (Cassell & Symon, 1994; Marschan-Piekkari, 2004). Therefore, it 
can always be discussed if we used and collected the right information. With the limited 
resources, information and time available we decided that the variables we chose were the 
best for us. By interviewing people from the inside we got their view of the situation, and then 
by help of theory, we drew the relevant conclusions. This research could have been more 
extensive, with, for example, observations and surveys among customers and competitors, but 
with the limited resources available this was not possible. 
 
Even if the respondents for the research are the best suited, they might not always leave the 
correct information (Jacobsen, 2002). We used four phone interviews for our research, and 
from them we got relatively similar information. In some interviews we noticed that the 
person was careful in his selection of words, and wanted to give a relatively good picture, but 
when we compiled all the information it was relatively easy to interpret the situation. Since 
we could see a pattern through our respondents’ answers, we think that our results could be 
regarded as valid.  
 
The next thing to take into consideration is the reliability of the research. We have to evaluate 
and see if there are any factors that have influenced the research, and, therefore, given us the 
result we have (Cassell & Symon, 1994). It is hard to determine if our results are reliable. We 
have collected our information through interviews and without knowing the respondents it is 
difficult to conclude if their answers truly reflect their opinion. This research can have been 
influenced by the interview- and research-effect (Miller & Brewer, 2003; Jacobsen, 2002). 
The respondents knew that this research was conducted to find out what had gone wrong in 
their company, and how this might have affected their external relations. However, the 
answers showed that they had a very clear opinion of what had happened, and there were 
similarities in their answers. Since the respondents were more or less randomly chosen, it is 
relative reliable to conclude that they spoken their opinion and it was not something they 
made up during the interview.  
 
Since all the interviews were conducted over the phone, and the respondents were at a 
familiar place, they might have contributed in that they all felt very comfortable to speak 
freely (Jacobsen, 2002). The time for the interviews was also adjusted to suit the respondents 
(Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2005). When we called them we made sure that they had time to talk 
and were not stressed. The interviews took place when the pilots were free from work, hence, 
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 they were not thinking about their next flight and there was no opportunity that any co-worker 
could here what they were saying.      
It can be difficult to conclude, if a qualitative research is valid and reliable, since the research 
method often is influenced by the context. We mean that our conclusions are based upon deep 
consideration and analysis of the answers from the interviews with help of the theory. Our 
conclusions might not be used as a generalization of our phenomenon, but they might be 
helpful to understand what can happen in an M&A, and how the M&A’s external relations 
can be affected. It is difficult to generalize our findings since we only examined one M&A, in 
an industry with several unique features.       
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 4.0 Theory 
4.1 Mergers and Acquisitions 
Peng (2006) defines a merger as “the combination of assets, operations, and management of 
two firms to establish a new legal entity” (p. 377), and an acquisition as “the transfer of 
control of assets, operations, and management from one firm (target) to another (acquirer)” (p. 
377). 
 
M&As can be established in three different ways. These primary categories of M&As are: 
horizontal, vertical and conglomerates. A horizontal M&A is when two competing firms in 
the same industry merge and they accumulate experience by common technology. About 70% 
of all M&As are horizontal (Peng, 2006). The vertical M&A is deals involving one firm 
merging/acquiring suppliers (upstream) or buyers (downstream). Only about 10% of the 
M&As are vertical. The last category is conglomerates; these M&As involve transactions 
between firms in product-unrelated industries. Approximately 20% of all M&As are 
conglomerate (Lubatkin 1983; Peng, 2006). A related M&A can benefit more from the 
acquired firm than an unrelated M&A can, and then also gain higher returns (Singh & 
Montgomery, 1987; Lubatkin, 1983). 
 
There are three main drivers for M&As; synergies, hubris and managerial motives 
(Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993; Seth et al., 2000; Peng, 2006). The synergies a firm can 
attain by M&As are increased market share, overcome entry barriers, reduce risk, scope of 
economies, leverage superior managerial capabilities, access to complementary resources, 
learning and developing new skills, and advantage of market opening and globalization. 
Hubris motives can be managers, who have overconfidence in their capabilities and herd 
behavior, these are late movers that are eager to catch up and do everything in a short time 
period. The last driver for M&As is managerial motives; these are self-interest actions such as 
empire building guided by informal norms and cognitions, and agency problems (Lubatkin, 
1983). The synergistic motives can add value to M&As, while managerial motives may 
actually reduce value. Hubris motives, on the other hand, imply zero correlation between 
target and gains (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993; Seth et al., 2000).  
 
Many M&As are established to create synergies, but not many of them pay off. They lose 
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 their revenues right after the merger because they are too focused on cost synergies and 
integration, and fail to create organic growth (Bekier et al., 2001; Bekier & Shelton, 2002). 
Even if having a good cost saving plan, fluctuations in revenue can quickly outweigh the 
planned costs. McKinsey and Southern Methodist University conducted research in the end of 
the 1990s, showing that half of the revenue loss was because of underperformance while 
unsettled customers and distracted staff could explain the other half. If an M&A pursues 
growth, instead of only focusing on cost cutting, they can generate a positive dynamic that 
make its objectives easier to achieve, including cost savings. A focus on growth could also 
motivate employees much better than a cost cutting strategy (Bekier et al., 2001).    
 
How effective the M&A will be depends on extensive planning and careful implementation 
(Blake & Mouton, 1984; Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; Salter & Weinhold, 1979)2. The failing rate 
is high within M&As, one reason to this is the lack of consideration of different factors both 
in the pre-acquisition phase and the post-acquisition phase (Jones & Miskell, 2007). In the 
pre-acquisition phase, the failures can be traced back into a synergy trap, they pay too much 
to the target firm because of executive hubris or managerial motives. Another pre-acquisition 
problem is poor screening and pre-planning and a failure of achieving strategic fit (Firstbrook, 
2007). Also, in the post-acquisition phase there are some integration problems that have to be 
taken into consideration in M&As. Not only the strategic fit in an M&A has to be achieved 
but also the organizational fit, similarity in cultures, systems and structures will facilitate the 
procedure (Lubatkin, 1983; Uhlenbruck & De Castro, 1998; Klein, 2006; Peng, 2006). For 
organizations and managers with experience from previous M&As, there is a bigger chance of 
succeeding (Lubatkin, 1983). Also, the stakeholders’ concerns in the post-acquisition can be a 
problem, the fear of losing the job, restructured responsibilities, and diminished power can be 
a contribution to a failure (Bekier & Shelton, 2002). 
 
 
4.1.1 Communication in the M&A 
Communication is a crucial factor in the M&A. Regardless of what factor of success is 
measured; communication is part of the foundation for the factor to be successful. Without 
communicating information, misunderstandings, insecurities and stress might occur. 
According to Lloyd (2006) few situations can create more stress or trauma for the employees 
                                                          
2 Nahavandi, A & Malekzadeh, 1988 
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 than an M&A. Furthermore, Chapman (2004) argues that maintaining a dialogue with 
employees is essential during M&As, and successful companies will keep these channels 
open long after the new company has formed. Failing in communicate the merger to 
employees can lead to major losses in the sales force, and with them, the customers (Bekier & 
Shelton, 2002).   
 
In order to distribute and communicate information, all executives shall have one singular 
voice to provide direction, clarify misconceptions, and express positive energy. Furthermore, 
the communication must be regular and constant in order to keep the employees trust (Lloyd, 
2006). A survey of over 330 European M&As conducted by London-based Acquisition and 
Merger Research found that of the M&As studied, 75 percent failed in establishing a 
communication plan (Speight & Goodman, 1998).  
 
4.1.2 Screening and Strategic fit 
According to several authors (see for example Chapman, Waight, etcetera) the screening and 
pre-planning phase is a crucial success factor for M&As. The more planning prior to the event 
the better, this since the pre-planning phase will affect all areas of the business and the 
success of the M&A will depend greatly on how the integration is handled (Chapman, 2004). 
Waight (2004) states that it is not merely the financial, economic and commercial aspects of 
the M&A that will affect the outcome of the pre-planning, but also the Human Resource 
department (HR). The role of the HR might be very different in the merging firms and it will 
be affected by the culture of the respective companies.  
 
An early detailed plan over how the implementation of the M&A will be executed is of great 
importance. This plan shall contain elements such as organizational structure, product lines, 
management structure, and business process. Furthermore, an accelerating integration is 
central. While it is important to integrate well, it is just as important to integrate quickly 
(Camara & Renjen, 2004). Another author that emphasizes the importance of pre-planning in 
order to reach a strategic fit between the companies is Caroline Firstbrook (2007). She 
highlights the importance of having a clear view of what the acquired firm’s role will be in 
their strategy. Further on she points out that even when the strategy is clear, many companies 
do not spend the proper amount of time to look for a company that will be the best fit for the 
specific strategy. The company just acquires the first company that looks like a fit with little 
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 further research (Firstbrook, 2007). This indicates that the synergies that would have occurred 
do not come about, due to the lack of matching and complementary strategic capabilities 
between the companies. The better the strategic fit is between the two companies the easier it 
is to succeed (Lubatkin, 1983). 
 
4.1.3 Organizational fit and Management  
Castro and Uhlenbruck (1998) argue that, organizational fit, can be measured by the number 
of organizational adjustments that have to be implemented after the acquisition. Furthermore, 
the acquiring firm has to take into consideration how deep the integration between the 
companies should be, and the more integration the higher organizational fit. This implies that 
organizational fit should be a part of the screening process where the acquiring firm looks for 
potential companies to buy. Consequently, Peng (2006) defines organizational fit as 
similarities in culture, structure and systems. Furthermore, Peng emphasizes the importance of 
investigating the organizational fit before the acquisition. However, he points out that this is 
seldom the case. Around 80 % of the acquirers have not done proper studies on the 
organizational fit. 
 
A common difficulty in acquisitions is relational problems. Being manager in one firm and 
then merge with another and get another role can create obstacles and the allocation of power 
can also be a problem. If the acquirer is much larger then the acquired firm, there can be 
power differential between the firms and the largest firm’s managers have more influence, 
which can lead to that the managers from the acquired firm feels unwelcome and run over. 
The acquirer firm’s managers can feel a pressure of implementing the new order quickly to 
meet performance expectation which can be seen as they have greater capabilities to enforce 
their preferences than the other firm’s manager. It is not only the size differences that matter 
for the managers but also the beliefs of superiority and inferiority between the firms. From in 
one firm being in the core of the organization, to being reduced significance to the overall 
business, ends up with them losing impact, status and power relative to the managers from the 
other firm. All of this can lead to management problems and maybe that the resources are not 
used as good as they could. People can also feel that they are worth less then what they are 
(Pablo, 1994).  
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 4.1.4 Knowledge Transfer 
It is becoming increasingly obvious that the employees and their knowledge are an essential 
part of a company. In order to examine knowledge, the term has to be defined. Knowledge 
consists of two parts: tacit and explicit. In 1995, Nonaka and Takeuchi published their work 
“The Knowledge-Creating Company”, which points out that organizational knowledge is 
created through a continuous dialogue between “tacit” and “explicit” knowledge. According 
to the authors the distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge is referred to as the 
epistemological dimension. Explicit knowledge can be described as “codified knowledge that 
is transmittable in formal, systematic language. On the other hand, tacit knowledge has a 
personal quality, which makes it hard to formalize and communicate” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
p.14, 1995). The main difference between these two types of knowledge is that explicit 
knowledge can easily be shared through databases or equivalent systems among different 
departments and subsidiaries, while the tacit knowledge is produced in the individuals mind, 
and involves concrete know-how and skills, which apply to special contexts.  
 
As mentioned and as in all organizations, the individuals in the companies play a central role 
especially during the M&A. One role is the knowledge transfer process, specifically in 
articulating and legitimizing the knowledge base and in shaping and interpreting the 
organizational context (Empson, 2001). Companies’ resources are often based on 
technologies that rest on the possession of distinctive knowledge-based assets. Transferring 
and exploiting knowledge effectively and efficiently in M&As are essential. Knowledge 
transfer is basically about sharing and creating knowledge within a company, and between its 
individuals, and it is achieved when the acquirer appropriates technologies and capabilities in 
the acquired firm and applies them to commercial ends (Gooderham & Nordhaug, 2003; 
Ranft & Lord, 2002). In an environment with increasing competition, knowledge and 
knowledge transfer is crucial for a company’s existence and survival, especially in the context 
of M&As which are suppose to generate synergy effects (Gooderham & Nordhaug, 2003).  
 
4.1.5 Stakeholders and customers 
Above we examined one aspect of the employees in an M&A. The employees are one of the 
many different stakeholder groups that are affected by the M&A. During the integration 
process the stakeholders’ concerns are something that should be taken into consideration. The 
first priority of most firms is the task issues, such as a common financial reporting, and those 
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 issues do not pay that much attention to the issues regarding people in an M&A. This can 
result in low morale and high turnover among for example, the companies’ best talents 
(Bekier & Shelton, 2002; Peng, 2006).  
 
In the M&A there are stakeholders at all levels who are concerned about the outcome of the 
M&A, from investors and management to employees and customers. The investors are most 
interested in their investment and reflect about the benefits, returns and revenues they can or 
cannot get. For the top management it is the difficulties to attain synergies, internal conflicts 
and unrealistic euphoria, which is likely to take up most of their concern. The middle 
management might worry about different issues such as job security, the expectations put on 
them in the M&A process and at the same time managing their regular job. The scale and 
scope of their tasks might overwhelm them. The front-line employees might be concerned 
about information to the customers, when the lay-off begins and who is setting the priorities 
and objectives (Peng, 2006).  
 
The last stakeholder group discussed here is the customers. Customers are an important factor 
for an M&A to succeed. As talked about before, many M&As do not pay off, and one reason 
for that are unsettled customers (Bekier et al., 2001). Therefore, it is of importance for an 
M&A to take their customers into consideration. Some customers might not be concerned 
about the M&A, while some might feel troubled about service quality dips and whether 
different factors still concerns the company (Peng, 2006). After the merger the companies are 
often concerned about cost cutting and integration and tend to forget the day-to-day business, 
resulting in nervous customers to flee. If a big customer does not get the attention he thinks he 
needs, he might choose a different company. To overcome these problems the managers 
should spend, as much time winning the customers, as they do persuading analyst and 
investors, and the merging firms should also create an appropriate brand identity for their 
customers (Bekier & Shelton, 2002; Basu, 2006). As soon as the deal is done the company 
should focus on their customer base before there will be too much turmoil, they can always go 
back later and cut costs. Once a customer is gone it is very hard to win them back again. One 
way of keeping the customer base is by keeping the sales force. The sales force is often the 
contact the customers have with the company, they are the key messengers to communicate 
the merger’s benefits. By having a good communication throughout the company during the 
merger and especially win over the sales force, a big step to maintain the customer base is 
accomplished (Bekier & Shelton, 2002).          
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 4.2 Acculturation 
A big challenge in M&As are the culture clash that can occur when two different cultures 
integrates. Culture can be defined in many different ways, one of the most common is 
Hofstede’s definition of culture:  
 
“a system of values, beliefs, expectations and goals shared by members of a group that 
distinguished them from others” (Hofstede, 2001).    
 
Hofstede (2003) also argue that this is a product of collective programming of the mind, that 
culture is something that is created in interaction with others. O’Reilly et al (1991) writes that 
organizational culture have a great impact on individuals commitment, productivity and 
satisfaction within an organization, since individuals tend to seek to groups that have similar 
values to their own, and avoid groups with dissimilar values. Organizational cultures are 
unwilling to change, incrementally adaptive, and constantly in flux. This is because cultures 
are socially constructed realities where we experience changes depending how we perceive 
culture (Meyerson & Martin, 1987).      
 
A culture clash can affect the M&A in several levels. It can be shown by lower commitment 
and cooperation among employees, a higher turnover among acquired employees, a decline in 
the performance of the acquired firm and a reduced shareholder value at the acquiring firm 
(Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001). To overcome the cultural clash and succeed, the M&A must 
achieve acculturation, which is a major post-acquisition challenge to acquiring firms. A 
survey done by Booz and Hamilton Inc. (1985)3, showed that the integration of organizational 
cultures is more important than financial or strategic factors for the success of the M&A. 
Larsson and Lubatkin (2001) discuss the importance of acculturation in their article and 
define it as:  
 
“Acculturation in mergers and acquisitions is the outcome of a cooperative process whereby 
the beliefs, assumptions and values of two previously independent work forces form a jointly 
determined culture” (Larsson & Lubatkin, p. 1574, 2001). 
 
In their article (2001) they refer to a study by Cartwright and Cooper (1993). Their results 
                                                          
3 Referenced in Cartwright & Cooper, 1993 
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 suggest that acculturation is predetermined by cultural differences between the companies and 
therefore, is outside the control of the company. Larsson and Lubatkin however, present a 
different view of the problems with acculturation. Their research concluded that in order to 
achieve acculturation there are mainly one thing the acquiring company have to consider, and 
that is how to involve the employees in social activities. They also concluded that achieving 
acculturation is of equal importance, even if it is a cross-border mergers or a merger between 
two firms from the same country.   
 
There are different socializations mechanisms that can be used to achieve acculturation 
depending on the acquiring firms aim, and the relatedness between the two firms (Nahavandi 
& Malekzadeh, 1988). If the buyer’s aim is to manage and control the new company, then 
they are more likely to meet higher resistance, and therefore, have to apply other methods to 
achieve acculturation. Then the socialization process has to include senior management 
involvement, transition teams and some employee’s rotation. But if the acquired firm is to be 
a highly independent part of the new organization then the author’s conclusions are that 
introduction programs, cross visits, and celebrations can help to create acculturation (Larsson 
& Lubatkin, 2001). 
 
4.2.1 Cultural change 
Meyerson and Martin (1987) discuss culture from three different paradigms and how cultural 
change can be viewed from these. The first paradigm focuses on consistency, consensus, and 
leadership. The culture can be seen as an umbrella, a dominant culture, and it emphasize 
integration and homogeneity. Cultural changes according to this paradigm are often controlled 
by top management and shared throughout the organization. The second paradigm is 
characterized by differentiation and diversity, where the culture is influenced by both external 
and internal factors. This paradigm emphasizes inconsistencies and subculture differentiation. 
In this paradigm the cultural changes are diffuse and unintentional, and the changes are 
explicitly linked to other sources and types of change. In the last paradigm ambiguity is 
accepted, and is an inevitable part of organizational life, while it is often denied or channeling 
in the other two paradigms. In this third paradigm incompatible interpretations are 
simultaneously entertained, and paradoxes are accepted. Individuals agree in some viewpoints 
while disagree about others and are ignorant of or indifferent to some. Cultural change 
according to the last paradigm is that any change between individuals, among patterns of 
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 connections and interpretations is cultural change, and there must be individual adjustment to 
environmental fluctuations (Meyerson & Martin, 1987).     
 
These three paradigms have very different implications to manage cultural change. The first 
one is more hopeful that organization wide cultural changes will be successfully initiated and 
controlled by those in leadership positions. The second paradigm is more constricted and 
means that changes have both intentional and unintentional localized impact, but that 
organization wide control will be unlikely. Paradigm three says that all cultural members, not 
only the leaders, are changed by the cultures they live in, and that they all are inevitably and 
constantly changed. The cultural control is determined by a person’s choice or paradigmatic 
viewpoints (Meyerson & Martin, 1987).  
 
Another author that discussed culture and cultural change is Schein (1968, 1985). He 
describes cultural change as a three-stage process, where the acknowledgment of ambiguity is 
a temporary, but necessary, stage in the change process. First there is the unfreezing stage, 
when individuals and organizations acknowledge the ambiguity and the unknown, and 
disconfirmed evidence is recognized. In this stage a psychological safety is created. In the 
second stage, changes occur, new behaviors and their meanings are learned. In the final stage, 
the refreezing stage, the ambiguity is denied again, and the new ways of behaving becomes 
internalized. In this change process there is an assumption that leaders can and do affect the 
cultural changes in an organization (Schein, 1968, 1985).     
 
4.3 Porters Five Forces 
Porter’s Five Forces (1980) is used to evaluate the factors within an industry, which affect a 
company’s ability to provide its customers with the appropriate output and to yield a 
substantial profit. The framework divides the factors, which determine the profitability of the 
industry into five forces, with the internal rivalry as the central one. The other four forces, 
namely the threat of the new entrants, buyer and supplier power as well as the threat of 
substitutes affect the internal rivalry thus explaining the central position of the latter. This 
model will be used to analyze the industry and as a base to evaluate the external relations. The 
power of the suppliers and the threat of new entrants will not be discussed since it will not 
contribute to answer the research question.  
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 4.3.1 Rivalry among competitors 
An industry with high rivalry can be characterized by frequent price wars, proliferation of 
new products, intense advertising campaigns and high-cost competitive actions and reactions. 
In order to analyze the competition between the players within this industry, there are three 
factors to be considered. These are the structure of the market, the level of demand and 
various exit barriers.  
 
The structure of the market depends on the number of competitors and the similarities in size, 
influence, and product offering among the rivals. If an industry is concentrated, there are also 
fewer players, and the competitors will probably restrain their rivalry since they can recognize 
their mutual interdependence. If the rivals have similar size, influence and product offering it 
can increase the rivalry in the industry, this since it is hard to differentiate their products. This 
is especially the case in the airline industry, where several companies go into bankruptcy. If 
an industry instead is having a dominant player, this player can set the prices and punish the 
firms that diverge too much from the prices.  
 
The level of demand can depend on high-price, low frequency purchases. In a industry with 
low-price and more frequently bought goods, the consumers do not spend too much time 
planning their purchases and often stick to the well known brands. While in the high-price 
industry the consumers take more time to find good deals, and do not always rely on the 
reputation of a firm. The level of demand can also lead to over-capacity. For example in the 
airline industry, if a new company enters a route already served by other companies it can 
result in over-capacity and lead to price-cutting. Also a slow growth industry or decline can 
affect the rivalry. When facing a lower demand the firms can become more desperate and 
unleash competitive actions not used before.  
 
At last, various exit barriers can also affect the rivalry among competitors. If the cost to exit is 
too high, the firms might decide to stay in the industry and operate at a loss. Different exit 
barriers can be specialized assets and investments such as machines, which cannot be sold off 
easily. Another exit barrier can be the feelings and emotions of an executive failure, which 
can be high. Before admitting a failure, the executives might try everything to manage to 
survive in the industry, before taking the firm out of the industry.          
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 4.3.2 Customer power 
The customers’ power refers to the customers’ possibility to influence the prices in the 
industry or increase the costs for the producers by demanding better product quality or 
service.  Therefore, powerful customers can become a threat and possible end up reducing 
overall profits. The size of the customer base, the numbers of customers, the switching costs 
and the products importance for the customers are factors that will determine how powerful 
the customers in the industry are.  
 
If the customer base is small, the buyers will have a stronger bargaining power. The 
customers can in these situations play the suppliers against each other by demanding lower 
price and quality improvement. How high the switching costs for the buyers are can also 
determine the power they hold. In an industry with standard, undifferentiated products the 
customer power can be strong. The cost of switching supplier is not that high when dealing 
with commodity products and therefore, the customers’ power increase. On the other hand, if 
a product is of great importance for the customer, their bargaining power decrease and the 
suppliers power increase. Another factor that might influence the power the buyer has, is the 
world economy. If being in a recession, the buyers cannot spend as much money as before, 
resulting in an increase in their power and a decrease in prices.    
    
4.2.5 Threat of substitutes 
If substitutes exist in an industry, this creates limitations when it comes to price and profit. 
The elements that indicate the power of substitute products are price and/or service in the 
substitute market against competition, switching costs, product differentiation and 
competitive conditions in the substitute market.  
 
If a substitute has a lower price, better service and/or superior quality and function than the 
existing products, it can quickly take customers away from the focal industry. However, if the 
substitutes are inferior they will not be a major threat against the already existing products. 
The switching costs and product differentiation can also affect the power of substitutes. In an 
undifferentiated product category with low switching cost, the threat of substitutes is much 
greater than when the switching costs are too high. If an existing product and the substitute 
are as easy to access, the switching costs decrease and the power of the substitute increase. An 
example of when switching costs can be too high is in the transoceanic transportation. It is 
  40
 hard to find a substitute for the airlines operating these routes, resulting in a greater power for 
the existing companies.        
  
4.4 M&As in the aviation industry 
Some of the most important reasons for M&As in the airline industry are to increase market 
power, overcome entry barriers, and enhance the operating efficiency. A merger in the 
industry can change the market structure, especially if two big players merge, affecting all 
participants, including the rivals. To prevent the creation of monopolies in the US, if a firm 
through a merger gets excessive market power, the Airlines Deregulation Act of 1978 exist. 
This act tries to foster market competition and economic efficiency (Gong & Firth, 2006). 
 
In the airline industry, horizontal M&As are most common. These M&As occur to reduce 
competition or increase the market coverage by getting a complementary market. When an 
M&A occurs, the rival’s reactions will depend on the market share the new competitor creates 
relative to the one the two merging firms had before, the reactions are negatively related to the 
change in market share. These evidence found, may justify the industry’s opposition to 
mergers, since it may hurt the competitors, and the regulatory concerns that merger will create 
a collusive market may be dampened (Gong & Firth, 2006).            
 
Kim and Singal (1993) looked at all the airline mergers that took place in the US during the 
years 1985-1988. During these years the department of transportation governed the airline 
industry and they allowed all the mergers that were waiting for approval. The evidence from 
this research showed an increase in the fares, the merging firms raised their prices resulting in 
that also the competitors raised their fares. Further on it also shows, for the total sample, that 
efficiency gains are dominated by increase in market power.     
 
4.4.1 Air France – KLM Group 
One famous merger in the European airline industry is the one between Air France and KLM. 
In 2004, the implementation of the Air France and KLM merger took place. Air France and 
KLM were both big players in the European airline industry and after the merger they had the 
highest annual revenue of the world’s airlines (Sparaco, 2005). They have rationalized their 
network to some of their destinations, on a loss-making route they both were operating before, 
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 they closed down the route for one of the companies to make the route more profitable. Air 
France still has a three-class operation while KLM only have a two-class operation, by having 
it like this the companies have a bigger product differentiation and can attract a wider 
spectrum of customers (Buyck, 2005). They are trying to further streamline their fleet, as it is 
today, they have many different types of aircrafts, which they will reduce to create an overall 
fleet with greater operating efficiency (Sparaco, 2005).  
 
The top management knew that it would be hard to implement the merger to make it a 
success. Therefore, they decided to take it careful and slow and not go into all sorts of 
implementation too fast. They wanted to avoid producing negative sentiments among the 
employees. During the integration they tried to avoid competition between the teams and 
instead concentrate on selling tickets, to avoid conflicts. Everybody was striving for the same 
goal. One of the hurdles to overcome in the integration was the opinion among the Dutch 
stakeholders that the merger was a bad thing and that KLM probably would disappear after 
the merger and the business would be moved. This did not happened since Amsterdam airport 
had a big sheer volume of KLM’s operations. The perception disappeared when the 
companies proved that this could work out and that they were able to grow (Buyck, 2005).  
 
Before the merger, Air France and KLM agreed upon how big the potential in synergies could 
be. The new company managed to capitalize each other’s complementary strengths much 
faster than everyone expected and already after six months they had to raise their estimations. 
The synergies were achieved much faster than anticipated (Buyck, 2005; Sparaco, 2005).     
 
4.5 Formal institutions  
In Norway, the NCA is the body that governs the competition law. For an M&A to be 
established the two companies have to notify the authorities for approval. The authority 
advocate free competition and tries to prevent monopolistic situations (NCA, 2007). To be 
approved there are certain criteria that have to be fulfilled, among others, if two firms want to 
merge they have to make sure that they will not limit or control the market, fix purchasing and 
selling prices or abuse a dominant position. An M&A is not allowed to create or strengthen a 
significant restriction of competition. There can be a looser interpretation of these rules if 
there is a well functioned Nordic or European market or if the Norwegian customers will not 
get too affected (The competition act of 2004).  
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 4.5.1 M&A and Monopolistic situations 
An early definition of monopoly is Mund’s (1933) definition: “the antithesis of competition –
a state of affairs in which rival producers lack either the freedom, willingness or capability, 
due to want of access to a necessary resource or to an insufficiency of market demand, to 
compete” (Mund, 1933, p 100)4.  
 
An M&A can create a monopolistic situation, when substantially lessen the competition or 
when they try to create a monopoly (Brown, 1998). If an M&A creates a monopolistic 
situation, both the competitors and the customers will be affected. The competitors might not 
be able to compete on the same terms as the dominant player and may face a hard time 
surviving. The M&A can also with help of their market power decide to out compete their 
rivals or even acquire them. A set back for the companies in a monopolistic situation can be 
that their reputation and image among their customers have been hurt, because of their tactic 
to reach their position and their behavior (Collett, 1999). The customers can also be affected 
by the situation, since they might face higher prices and restricted selection (Steinberg, 1995).  
 
 
                                                          
4 Referred to in Salerno, 2004 
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 5.0 The Integration of SAS Braathens 
5.1 The Process 
In 2001 Braathens was acquired by the SAS Group as an autonomy subsidiary. A couple of 
years later as a consequence of the SAS Group’s reorganization into separate national 
divisions, in 2004 SAS Norway and Braathens merged into one company (SAS Group Annual 
Report, 2004).  
 
5.1.1 Communication 
From the beginning of the integration there has been a lack of communication from the 
management to the employees in SAS Braathens. Most of the employees got the information 
about the integration the same way as the rest of the society, through media. It was in the 
newspaper that the pilots found out that they now where going to work together with the 
pilots from the other company. One pilot remembers that the grapevine was a common 
channel of information.  
 
“You often hear a rumor what is going to happen through the grapevine first. The grapevine 
is the most common information channel, we do not hear it from the management.” 
 
Both sides have experienced a lack in the information flow about what the plans were and 
how the integration was going to be executed. One SAS pilot got the impression that the 
management did not know what to do, they just acquired Braathens and then waited to see 
what happened, “it felt very amateurish”. The communication and the information given is 
something that has been bad through out the whole integration process. For the employees it 
has been frustrated not knowing what is happening and if they could keep their jobs and it 
have created an uncertainty among the pilots. The employees have been trying to do the best 
of the situation, but if they had received more information from the management, if they had 
been more open, the integration might have had looked different. SAS has always been bad in 
inform their employees; it has often been through the newspaper they find out about 
something. But the situation is improving, and now they are actually given some information 
before its public.    
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 5.1.2 Reactions  
The news that the SAS Group was going to acquire Braathens came as a surprise too many. 
Braathens employees saw it in the beginning as something positive since the company was on 
its way to bankruptcy. And because they were bought up before they went bankruptcy they 
still had some legal rights. Some of the SAS employees on the other hand did not share the 
same positively thoughts. For them it would have been better to wait for Braathens to go 
bankruptcy and then acquire Braathens. The SAS employees did not understand why SAS 
acquired Braathens, because they had just dismissed SAS employees and now they got more 
people from Braathens. They did not see any advantages, except that they got some nice 
coworkers and that Braathens money went into the common funds, otherwise only an 
increased competition. Braathens was seen upon as an underdog by SAS. If Norwegian law 
had not protected Braathens5, SAS Braathens would not have existed in the same form as 
today. SAS wanted to acquire Braathens routes and aircrafts, they did not care that much 
about the personal, they just came along. And if SAS had not acquired Braathens probably 
some other company would have done it, and they would have got much worse conditions and 
lower salary.   
 
However, some SAS pilots did not care that much, as long as they had their salary and 
Braathens did not make the conditions worse for them. One SAS pilot was of the opinion:  
 
“Same salary, for same work, based on the seniority” (SAS pilot, 2007).  
 
From the beginning Braathens was supposed to operate as an independent division within the 
SAS Groups. When it later was announced that SAS Norway and Braathens were to become 
SAS Braathens, some pilots from Braathens saw it as a merger while the SAS employees saw 
it as an acquiring. The Braathens employees’ quite fast changed their opinion, and what was 
supposed to be a merger became an acquiring. The positivism in Braathens was dampened 
and from have been “Braathens” they were now “SAS”, in the beginning the work still moved 
on as before but during the integration it changed some. The Braathens pilot felt that they had 
nothing to say in the process, but most of them still saw it as something positive. It was better 
to still be alive then not longer exist.     
                                                          
5 SAS’ acquiring of Braathens was an activity transition, meaning that employees from both companies should 
be treated equal  
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 The new situation that occurred was tough and frustrated for the pilots. It created insecurity, 
not knowing what was going to happen and the employees were afraid of losing their jobs. 
There was also a fear that the whole company would go bankrupt. This fear does no longer 
exist, since both the management and the group have gone out and denied those rumors. The 
Braathens employees did not feel welcome in SAS’s unions. But all the pilots emphasize that 
the insecurity, frustration and disagreements do not affect the every day work. Everyone 
behaves very professionally and leaves the rest to the unions to solve.  
 
5.1.3 Two became one 
From the beginning the merger went wrong. When the two firms merged together the strategy 
was to take the best from each company, to create a “best practice”. This did not happened, 
instead, according to some pilots it was the “SAS practice” that applied. Since SAS was 
government ruled and a top-down organization it was lengthier and heavier ran, than 
Braathens. SAS Braathens should have had taken more of Braathens practices and had a 
flatter organization, but ended up with a large administration with several decision levels. Still 
today the operational is perceived as a slow process. 
 
SAS and Braathens had different types of aircrafts. In the beginning this created operational 
difficulties, for example crew was put on planes they could not operate. This resulted in 
delays or cancellations and created negativity among the employees. The crew was also 
referred to, as ex Braathens and ex SAS, only to know their background, but this did not have 
a positive effect, it did not facilitate the integration and was an obstacle when they were trying 
to create a common culture.   
 
5.1.4 Shrinking the organization 
When SAS acquired Braathens they had to shrink the organization and it was the employees 
from Braathens that had to take the fall. The Braathens pilot lost several of their coworkers. 
Especially the personal in Braathens Ground Handling, was bad treated. The department was 
shut down resulting in major dismissals. But their dismissal was not entitled and the fight 
between the former employees and SAS about who was right and wrong went all the way up 
to court. This matter did create uncertainty among employees and got publicity in the media. 
In 2006 the verdict was announced and the former Braathens employees were the winners. 
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 For the ex-Braathens employees in SAS Braathens this was a victory since it showed that they 
could not be treated differently than the SAS employees and their former coworkers had 
gained redressed. 
 
The technical division was also eliminated, today there is only a handful employees left. The 
group from Braathens that survived the shrinking best was the pilots and crews. Also the 
administration was affected. One pilot from Braathens feels that Braathens was slaughtered in 
the integration.  
  
5.2 Culture Clash 
Even if it was two companies from the same nation, the organizational culture in the 
companies was still very different. It was a culture clash when the two firms merged, it was 
we and they, and still are in some situations.  
 
One Braathens pilot believes that one reason behind the culture clash was the fact that the 
leadership style in the companies differed a lot. “The SAS leadership was aggressive and 
speculative, and they did not care about teamwork, while the leaders in Braathens put out the 
rules and then teamwork applied” (Braathens pilot, 2007). The SAS-attitude also created 
some problems. Braathens was of the opinion that SAS perceived themselves as a little better 
than the rest (confirmed by a SAS pilot) and felt that the SAS employees were looking down 
on them and that they were worth less. And while Braathens was a down-to-earth company, 
SAS was government owned and farsighted.    
 
If you as a Braathens pilot did not know any SAS pilot from before it could be hard to get 
integrated in the company. The cabin crew from SAS also experienced a tough integration and 
some of them quit because they did not want to be a part or the new company. But with the 
time the problems have decreased. The culture clash is no longer that obvious. There are still 
some differences, but now crew from both companies is working together and pilots from 
SAS and Braathens are flying together in the same cockpit. The SAS-attitude is also gone, 
now all the employees are seen as equal. SAS Braathens has been able to create a common 
organizational culture and the pilots have a common sight on the future. One problem though 
is that some pilots do not enjoy working in SAS Braathens as much as they did before. They 
can read on different places that the company has to work with their cultural differences, 
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 which creates frustration since as mentioned above there are hardly any differences anymore.    
 
        Table 5.1 Opinions of Braathens and SAS 
 Braathens SAS 
 
Braathens 
employees 
Popular 
Open 
Flexible 
Careful 
Efficient 
Arrogant and reserved 
Sulky 
Squared 
Superior 
Inefficient 
 
 
 
SAS employees 
Unprofessional 
Reliable 
National 
Less competence 
Characterized by ad 
hoc solutions 
Spendthrift 
Professional 
Modern and stylish 
International  
High competence 
Reliable and clear 
regulations 
Profit thinking 
(Nygård, 2006) 
 
5.3 The Seniority list 
A major problem in SAS Braathens that creates disagreements and a bad atmosphere among 
the pilots is the seniority list. During the integration there were co-pilots in SAS that had 
worked for the company for 18 years while there were captains in Braathens that worked for 
only 7 years. The SAS co-pilots thought this was an unfair situation, they had much more 
experience than the captains from Braathens and still they were under them in seniority. To 
solve the immediate problem, the management considered the problem when they decided 
who was flying with whom, and an ”older” co-pilot did not have to fly with a “younger” 
captain. This system works well and the cooperation difficulties are fading away but there is 
still some resistance and some employees do not say hello to each other. The management is 
trying to improve the situation and more co-pilots are becoming captains now, but it takes 
time and creates frustration.    
 
As a pilot in SAS Norway you are also considered a pilot in the SAS Group and have the 
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 possibility to become captains also in Sweden or Denmark. Pilots from Braathens, however, 
are only considered as pilots in SAS Braathens and can only become captains in Norway. One 
reason why Braathens pilots are not integrated fully into the SAS Group is because being a 
captain in the SAS Group also brings along the possibility to fly long distance routes, which is 
considered to be attractive. The competition about these prestige’s routes would increase if 
Braathens pilots also were allowed to fly these, something pilots from SAS might want to 
avoid. A Braathens pilot means that they might never be fully integrated into the SAS Group 
because of this, and goes on that he does not care that much about flying the long distance 
routes, if he was, he would from the beginning have started in a different company.        
    
5.4 Politics lies behind 
It was a political choice from SAS’s side to acquire Braathens. One pilot suspects that the 
decision was taken on the highest level in Norway, by a politician or even by the Prime 
Minister himself. And afterwards SAS was requested to acquire Braathens. There are still 
questions about who acquired whom and who made the decisions, but those questions will 
probably never get an answer because of all politic involved and the fear of media.     
 
Some of the pilots argue that it is the political game that is the reason to why the integration 
was not successful. Behind this lie the problems with Linjeflyg and Commuter, when a new 
company becomes a part of the SAS Group they have had to pay for it by sacrifice seniority 
years. In 1992 Linjeflyg was integrated in Sweden. During the integration the pilots from 
Linjeflyg was degraded with five years on the seniority list, it was first in 1997 they received 
the offer about fully group seniority. The same happened to the pilots in SAS Commuter 
when they were integrated, they also lost some of their seniority years and was not allowed 
fully group seniority from the beginning.  
 
So far the ex-Braathens pilots have not been degraded five years, but this is a major problem 
in the process. The degradation is not a spoken wish but the agenda for the struggling among 
the unions. The SAS Braathens management is aware of the problem, but they are afraid of 
interfering with the unions’ responsibility. They are scared that a new “Go Harry”6 will take 
place if they interfere.  
                                                          
6 ”Go Harry” is explained under subheading 5.6 Conflicts 
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 5.4.1 Management 
The management has been very passive during the internal conflicts. They have managed to 
integrate themselves, but they have not dared to grab the problems among the employees in 
fear of creating bigger problems, which has resulted in that the employees have had to take 
care of themselves. They have also not been as open as the employees would have wanted 
them to be. One pilot’s comment about the management: 
 
“They are listening to what we are saying, but from that to action…” 
 
The integration process has been quite slow. In the beginning of 2007, a pilot took the 
initiative to try to solve some of the problems that exist in SAS Braathens, meaning this is the 
way to go. Thanks to this there will be common conditions for the pilots from the 1st of June. 
The management was afraid that the initiative came to early, something the pilot smiles at. 
His personal opinion is that this is something that should have happened long time ago and it 
should not have been a pilot taking the initiative. The management should have had sit down 
with the employees, not only ex SK and ex BU7, and been open and discussed what was 
going to happen and how they together could solve the problems. But the management has 
only had a customer and revenues focus and not an employee focus at all. One SAS pilot even 
says that the dream of the former CEO of SAS was to dismiss all the employees and just have 
the administration left so that there would be no complaints.  
  
Some of the problems in the integration are due to the management. Their strategic choice 
with no openness and communication has not been successful. The political choice to merge 
SAS and Braathens was a surprise to many and would have required more information. One 
opinion is that the management has tried to play SAS and Braathens against each other, and as 
long as everyone behaves professional the management can continue.   
 
During the spring of 2007, all the employees in the group have participated in a survey, called 
puls, regarding the management, the process, and the integration etcetera. This can be an 
indication that the management wants to improve and therefore, need feedback about what 
has been done wrong. Now it is just for the pilots to wait and see if they are responding to the 
feedback. There has however, already been a set back with the survey. The survey showed 
                                                          
7 The unions within SAS and Braathens 
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 that there is dissatisfaction with the management, and one from the management meant that 
the survey was just acting as a protest against them. This action only provokes the employees 
again. There should be a common focus among the management and the employees; it should 
not be them and us.     
   
5.5 The Unions 
The unions played a major role in the integration. It was not easy to merge two competitors, 
and especially not since they both had strong unions on their side. Since SAS Norway was a 
part of the SAS Group, they had unions both national and together with Sweden and 
Denmark, and they also created an internally union within SAS during the integration. In the 
merger Braathens went out the Norwegian Airline union, but they kept the same conditions. 
The condition between SAS and Braathens was not identical there where some differences, 
but according to Braathens employees it worked fine. However, one SAS pilot pointed on 
those differences, different working hours, salaries and pensions, as one reason to the negative 
atmosphere. SAS had higher salaries than Braathens but during the integration Braathens’ 
increased some (not to the same level) and they had better pension. These differences should 
have been taken care of before the integration to facilitate.   
 
A big difference is that Braathens employees do not count as an equal part in the SAS Group. 
They do not belong to the common union within the group. This mean that they are not 
allowed flying long distance since an own division within the SAS GROUP operates those 
routes, and they cannot either transfer or fly for SAS Sweden and SAS Denmark.  
 
Union wise, the integration is not yet finished. There are still some differences between the 
sides, some issues will require more time before they get solved. Sometimes the discussions 
about the disagreements can be resembled as kinder garden mentality. The unions have also 
used media to talk crap about the other side. One pilot means this is not the way it should be, 
media should not be involved the disagreements should be handled internally. Because of the 
differences, the new employees that joined the company after the integration can decide by 
themselves which union they want to belong to. The dream of one SAS pilot is to get one 
common union for the pilots and one common for the cabin crew. This would facilitate the 
integration and would give the employees more energy to concentrate on their work and work 
against the negative view of SAS Braathens, instead of discussing and being irritate on the 
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 disagreements. But the situation is complex, since everyone has different opinions.    
 
5.6 Conflicts 
Several conflicts have occurred during the process many of them because of disagreements 
among the employees in SAS Braathens. Some conflicts could have been avoided by solving 
the status level before the integration or at least as fast as possible, but the management was 
probably afraid of a bigger conflict if they tried. The SAS Group tried to solve their status 
problems by restructuring to national divisions. But this backfired trough a big action called 
“Go Harry”. “Go Harry” was a common action among the pilots in the SAS Group for them 
to get what they wanted since they did not want to work in only national companies. Ex 
Braathens pilots were not involved in this action since they were not considered as pilots 
within the group. Pure legal this action was not a strike it was a disease. The pilots’ text 
messaged each other with the expression “Go Harry” to inform that they should call in sick. 
The action created an internal conflict in SAS Braathens. The Braathens pilots were opposed 
to the strike and they kept on working and tried to make the best of the situation, the company 
still had customers to serve.  
 
Even if there have been internal conflicts in SAS Braathens, ex Braathens’ have never used an 
illegal action to demonstrate. Instead of striking they have paid lawyers etcetera and followed 
the Norwegian law to get their rights through, as in the case with the former ground service 
employees.  
  
5.7 Present situation 
The political problems with the integration are not yet solved. But from the 1st of June the 
conditions for the pilots through the unions will be harmonized, no matter if they are ex 
Braathens or ex SAS. This means that they for example will get the same salary and working 
hours. However, the settlement between the unions does not include the seniority list because 
of the complex situation in SAS Group’s history with Linjeflyg and SAS Commuter. As the 
situation is today with the list Braathens pilots may not become a captain until they are close 
to retirement, but some feels rather that than have to start all over in a different company, 
even if it might not be too happy when a SAS pilot gets promoted earlier. Up to today, there 
has not yet been a situation where a co-pilot from Braathens should have checked out to 
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 become a captain. But if anyone gets stopped when this situation comes it can become a new 
internal conflict. The other problem with the seniority list is the discussion about long 
distance routes. The pilots from Braathens mean that giving them the same possibilities to 
become a captain and have a clause about the long distance routes can solve the problems. 
And they can maybe over time earn to fly these attractive routes. The problems with the 
seniority list will be solved sooner or later, but it has to be in cooperation with Sweden and 
Denmark because of the long distance routes.        
 
There are still some problems and disagreements among the employees and sometimes you 
can get treated as air, but this does not affect the every day work and the management is 
working on that everyone at least is saying hey to each other. One pilot says: 
 
“When we are flying from A to B there is no bad atmosphere. We do not discuss the problems 
with people from SAS only with Braathens’. We are very professional in our work and do not 
see how we can solve the problems in cockpits, we leave that to the unions for them to work it 
out.”   
 
Today there are also much less conflicts than in the beginning. Everybody is positive and they 
feel that they have a good starting point. One Braathens pilot has an assumption that if they 
cannot solve the political problems they cannot expand. They will in the future stagnate in 
Norway and will not follow the expansion as going on in the market. A fear is that the 
management does not dare or is not able to solve this because they are afraid that everything 
will crash. One positive thing in this matter is that SAS Sweden now is trying to clean up the 
problems with Linjeflyg, and if they succeed it can facilitate the integration process in SAS 
Braathens. Many of the pilots in SAS Braathens are optimists and hopes that everything will 
work out. 
 
A SAS pilot says that everything is working much better today than for one year ago, the 
atmosphere is much different. One proof was when he in the end of April was together with a 
Braathens crew and received the news that from the 1st of June the name of the company 
would no longer be SAS Braathens, but SAS Norway. He was surprised that the Braathens 
crew did not have a bad reaction, they just seemed to accept it without any discussion. One 
reason could be that the time has played its role, everyone has accepted their place and are 
now satisfied with the situation, the company is earning money and the customers are 
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 increasing. The pilot further on emphasizes that it is probably not because of the management 
they are where they are today. The management has been unprofessional and not being open 
at all, and therefore, most likely not contributed that much.       
 
5.8 Media 
SAS Braathens integration has not received the highest credit in the media. Problems with 
operational difficulties and internal conflicts have resulted in delays and cancellations, and 
media has not been late to report about that. Before the integration Braathens was perceived 
as a team and received good publicity among the public, while SAS did not have the team 
feeling and employees tipped off the media when something happened, resulting in a more 
negative image in the media. During the integration there were hopes that some of the 
positivism from Braathens would help SAS, but that has not been the case.   
 
Media has often given a negative angle of the integration, often a too negative view. The 
pilots think that this can have to do with the SAS monopoly. SAS Braathens has always 
struggled with media, something that has been very frustrated for the employees. They have 
been trying to strike back but it is not shown in the media the way they wanted to. In the last 
six months the picture of SAS Braathens in media has improved some, but still everything is 
not reported correctly and do not give a fair view of the reality. This creates irritation within 
the organization, but is likely something they have to live with, because of the company’s size 
and background.    
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 6.0 Analysis 
 
The merger between SAS and Braathens can be classified as a related horizontal merger. It is 
said, that these kind of mergers are the most likely to be successful. SAS Braathens has been 
able to create different synergies from the merger, such as coordinated traffic systems and 
resource utilization (SAS Group Annual report, 2004). But even with this favorable starting 
point, SAS Braathens has not managed to be as successful as, for example, Air France-KLM. 
     
6.1 Why does SAS Braathens struggle? 
From the beginning, SAS Braathens has struggled and has not been perceived as a successful 
merger. It all started with poor communication when the merger took place. The employees 
learned about the merger at the same time as the public, through the media. Throughout the 
merger, there has been poor communication from the management to the employees, and it is 
only now that the pilots can see an improvement and actually get information before the rest 
of the society. The lack of information has created insecurity among the employees in that 
they have not known what is going to happen, not even if they would be allowed to keep their 
jobs.  
 
It is hard to say how much screening and pre-planning the SAS Group conducted before 
acquiring Braathens. If Braathens had not been on its road to bankruptcy, this M&A might 
never have happened. Some of the pilots believe that the decision for SAS to acquire 
Braathens came from a higher level, someone high up in the government. If this is true, this 
might also explain the poor information that was communicated to the employees, when the 
M&A took place. From the beginning, the plan was that Braathens was going to operate as an 
autonomous subsidiary, and continue with their old operations. But when the SAS Group, in 
2004, decided to divide the company into national entities, the objectives changed. Without 
giving any information about what the merger was going to look like, this came as a surprise 
to the employees. No one knew what was going to happen, except that they now were 
considered as one company. There were no guidelines for how to integrate the two 
companies, at least not any that the employees knew about.  
 
SAS and Braathens were two different companies. While SAS was government-ruled, and a 
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 top-down organization, Braathens was flatter, and a down-to-earth organization. The thought 
was to create a best practice, by taking the best from each organization. This failed, and 
instead it was the SAS practice that applied. One piece of evidence demonstrating the lack of 
organizational and strategic fit is the problem the company experienced with their aircraft. 
SAS and Braathens operated with two different types of airplanes. This was not taken into 
consideration when the pilots started to fly together, they were signed up on planes they were 
not authorized to fly, which led to delays and cancellations. This created more stress and 
negativity among the employees, in an already stressful situation.  
 
The unions are another factor that affected the integration. With different unions and many 
opinions, it is hard to agree on common conditions. Some problems, such as different salaries 
and pensions, should have been taken care of before the M&A to avoid some disagreements. 
This shows a lack in the pre-planning and organizational fit. During the first years of the 
integration there were different conditions depending upon which company the employees 
belonged to. According to some, this worked well anyway, but it created frustration. Many of 
these problems were taken care of when the pilots working conditions became harmonized.  
 
Some of the pilots took the initiative for the common conditions in the beginning of 2007. 
This is something that should have been taken care of much earlier to facilitate the process. 
Camara and Renjen (2004) talk about how important it is to integrate quickly, something SAS 
Braathens ignored. It would also have been better if it were the management that had taken 
the initiative for the common conditions. Many of the employees have been frustrated with 
the management. The pilots think there has been too little communication from the 
management, and that the leadership really has not seemed to care. Some pilots even describe 
the merger as amateurish.  
 
The integration of SAS and Braathens might be a result of managerial motives, the 
government, and management wanting a bigger “empire”. The management was able to 
integrate themselves, but failed to integrate the employees. Because of all the politics and 
former problems with Linjeflyg and SAS Commuter, the management has not dared to, or 
been willing to, solve the problems within SAS Braathens. The process has been closed with a 
poor dialog and an unsuccessful strategy.  
 
In an M&A, it is of importance to take the employees into consideration. The management in 
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 SAS Braathens has only had a customer and revenue focus, and not an employee focus. It has 
been “them”, the management, and “they”, the employees. If the management had taken more 
considerations into the employees, some of the internal conflicts might have been avoided.  
 
One major problem during the integration was the seniority list. This has created 
disagreements and negativity among the pilots. Instead of the management trying to solve the 
problems concerning seniority before the integration, or even in the beginning, they have 
ignored it, which has resulted in internal conflicts. The seniority list has been a problem 
before in SAS, when they acquired Linjeflyg and SAS Commuter, but that was in the past and 
those problems have been solved. You should think that SAS learned by experience, that the 
seniority list would create a problem, and would have had this as one of the first priorities to 
solve. The management tried to facilitate the problems to some extent by not scheduling 
senior SAS co-pilots with younger Braathens captains, and now more co-pilots are becoming 
captains. The management might have been afraid of addressing these problems since they 
would have to interfere with the unions’ work, and maybe create a major conflict. On the 
other hand, by letting these problems remain, it has created a hostile atmosphere in the 
company, and no one knows what will happen if an ex-Braathens co-pilot will not be able to 
check out to become a captain when that day arrives.  
 
6.2 Two cultures become one 
Organizational culture has a great impact on individuals’ commitment, productivity and 
satisfaction within an organization. Achieving acculturation is a major post-acquisition 
challenge. If a company fails in achieving acculturation it can be shown by, for example high 
turnovers and cooperation difficulties among the employees. Larsson and Lubatkin (2001), 
believe that acculturation can only be reached by social activities, which include the 
management’s involvement. As discussed above, SAS Braathens’ management was not very 
involved in the day-to-day business, and they did not arrange any social activities.  
 
SAS and Braathens had different organizational cultures. While SAS employees were used to 
a top-down and aggressive and speculative leadership, Braathens’ put more emphasize on 
teamwork. When Braathens was integrated in SAS, they were looked down upon, and they 
were not worth as much as their SAS counterparts. SAS employees perceived themselves as 
better than the rest, and the employees from Braathens did not feel welcome. In the beginning, 
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 it was often “we” against “them”, and this still exists in some situations. But as time has 
passed, the culture differences are no longer that obvious.  
 
Meyerson and Martin’s (1987) third paradigm might explain the culture change in SAS 
Braathens. This paradigm tells us, that any change between individuals, among patterns of 
connections, and interpretations is cultural change, and there must be individual adjustment to 
environmental fluctuations. According to this, there has been a cultural change in SAS 
Braathens, the SAS employees do not longer perceive themselves as better than the Braathens 
employees, and it is no longer “we” against “them”, but instead everyone is equal. Further on, 
this paradigm says that it is not only the leaders that can change the culture, but all the culture 
members can affect it. In the SAS Braathens case, it seems that it is thanks to the employees 
that the company now has a relatively common culture. By flying and working together, they 
have learned to accept each other. They have now reached the final step, the refreezing step, 
in Schein’s (1968, 1985) three-step model, where the new ways and behavior have become 
internalized, and they are working together, towards a common vision of the future.     
 
6.3 External relations 
An M&A that struggles can affect the external relations in different ways. In order to analyze 
how SAS Braathens relations has been affected we will analyze the industry with help of 
Porter’s five forces, and other relevant theory.       
 
6.3.1 Competitors 
The industry within which SAS Braathens operates in is very complex, has many players, and 
several alliances exist. SAS Braathens is a national air carrier that operates within Norway 
and on some routes to the rest of Scandinavia. This means that the main competition they face 
is within Norway, with Norwegian Air Shuttle as their major competitor. For SAS Braathens, 
the success of the Norwegian airline industry is important. 
 
Even if the airline industry is characterized by hard competition, the competition within 
Norway is not as significant. With only two different companies operating most of the routes 
and even with a SAS Braathens monopoly on some routes, the company could have had a 
greater power to determine the price in the market, but thanks to the NCA and regulations, the 
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 prices are kept relatively stable. The competitors of SAS Braathens cover the same basic 
needs among the consumers. SAS Braathens though, does have some routes in Norway that 
are operated by them only, but on the other hand, Norwegian Air Shuttle has several 
international routes that are not operated by SAS Braathens, some of them might be covered 
by SAS International.     
 
Exit barriers in the airline industry can be said to be high. The airline companies have 
invested a lot in their airplanes and equipment, and even if they are able to sell them off, it 
might not be cost effective. Some air carriers even operate at a loss because of the fierce 
competition that exists (much because of the deregulation and low-cost companies), the exit 
barriers, and other issues, such as 9/11 and climbing fuel prices. If the companies do not 
manage to turn around, but keep on operating at a loss they will sooner or later go bankrupt or 
being acquired by another company, as in the Braathens case. Even if the power of the rivalry 
among competitors is relative strong, it might be possible for SAS Braathens to gain more 
market share by focusing on their integration. If they manage to solve their internal problems, 
the cancellations and strikes might decrease, and their brand might be valued more by the 
customers. Braathens has been a popular brand and company in Norway for many years, and 
if SAS Braathens finds a way to take advantage of this they might gain more trust.  
 
The relative homogeneousness of the products makes competition fierce. It is within the 
Norwegian market that SAS Braathens faces their highest level of competition. The 
homogeneousness of the companies operating in this market increases the competition on 
prices and of customers. A growing market (SAS Braathens, 2007; Norwegian Air Shuttle, 
2007) should lower the rivalry as companies can expand without having to conquer market 
shares. The increase of demand over the past last couple of years indicates positive 
macroeconomic conditions and a growing interest in travel. However, with the growing 
demand, the companies are expanding their fleets resulting in over-capacity and the rivalry is 
increasing. The excess capacity and competitive environment might lead to, as O’Leary and 
Spinetta, said a bloodbath (Sparaco, 2005), resulting in several bankruptcies.  
 
An M&A in an industry can change the market structure, especially if two big players merge, 
affecting all participants including the rivals. The competitors’ reactions will depend on the 
market power the new firm creates relative to the one the two merging firms had before. 
Before the SAS Group acquired Braathens, SAS and Braathens were the biggest players in 
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 Norway. Since Braathens already belonged to SAS before the merger in 2004, the market 
power SAS Braathens gained after the merger was not much greater than before. Norwegian 
Air Shuttle was not established until 2002, that is to say after that the SAS Group acquired 
Braathens (Norwegian Air Shuttle, 2007). Norwegian Air Shuttle’s head of information says 
that the merger between SAS and Braathens has not had a significant affect on them. During 
the strikes they have had an increase in passengers but afterwards it has been back to normal 
again (Ellingsen, 2007). Norwegian Air Shuttle is the biggest low-cost airline company within 
the Nordic countries, and they are trying to become more efficient by introducing high 
technology check-in machines (Norwegian Air Shuttle, 2007). In appendix 3, there are 
numbers showing the market share between SAS Braathens and Norwegian Air Shuttle on 
routes to/from Oslo in 2005.    
 
6.3.2 Customers 
The infrastructure, the purchasing power and the size of Norway, with large distances from 
north to south, represents a favorable market for the airline industry. The customers that the 
companies attract are more or less the whole Norwegian population, from business people to 
regular people.   
 
The power of the customers depends on which part of Norway the customers are from. In the 
south of Norway the customers have moderate to high power, since they can use other means 
of transport, as cars, buses and trains, to move within the southern region. In the north, 
however, the power is relative low. There are not many alternatives for the people in the north 
to go to the south except flying, due to the large distances. 
 
In the airline industry, the power of the customers can be said to be low. Taking the plane 
versus for example the car, can add value for the customers by reducing the time of travel. It 
can also produce cost savings, especially with regard to the low-cost airline companies. 
However, the customers’ power can increase as the threats of substitutes are increasing, 
especially on domestic and short-distance routes. The high-speed trains have become more 
and more common and have started to compete with the airline companies about the 
customers (Sparaco, 2005). In Norway, there are no high-speed trains, but an investigation 
showed that the train is the most environmentally friendly mean of transport (Andersen, 
2006). This might increase the importance of trains as a means of transport and the customers’ 
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 power, regarding the increased attention the environment and climate change has received in 
the last years (European Commission, 2007).  
 
Even if the customers are many and the actors in the airline industry are few (at least in 
Norway), the power of the customers can be strong, because the airline industry offers similar, 
undifferentiated products. For SAS Braathens, this means that if the customers are unsatisfied 
with the company they can easily change to another company, in this case to Norwegian Air 
Shuttle. One reason that some M&As do not pay off is unsettled customers (Bekier et al., 
2001). Once a customer is gone it is hard to win him back. A good communication to the 
employees, throughout the M&A, is vital, since it is the sale force that is the key messengers 
to the customer. The poor information in SAS Braathens merger and some service quality 
dips, might have contributed to the unsatisfied customers. Many customers have been 
unsatisfied with SAS Braathens, and have said that they will never fly with them again, but 
most of them are still coming back (SAS pilot, 2007).  
 
 
It has become more popular to fly, and the number of passengers that fly in Norway is 
increasing (SAS Braathens, 2007; Norwegian Air Shuttle, 2007, see also appendix 4). 
However, the customers do not have a great selection of companies to choose between. SAS 
Braathens has created a monopolistic situation on some routes, for example on the route 
between Oslo-Haugesund, when they in 2004, out competed Coast Air (NCA, 2007). This, of 
course, affected the competition, but the customers were also affected. People like it when 
they have a choice and not only one option, therefore, the market power of SAS Braathens has 
created negative reactions and worsen the image of the company.      
 
6.3.3 Media 
Media can be another factor that can affect the stakeholders in an M&A. People tend to 
believe what they read in the newspaper, without being critical. The media in Norway has a 
tendency to publish negative articles about SAS Braathens (SAS pilot, 2007). Both the fact 
that SAS Braathens is partly owned by the government and their monopolistic position might 
contribute to the negativity around the company. The people working in media are also 
customers in the airline industry and as said above, restricted selection affect the customers 
negatively. Media is also often fast to report negative news. When a big, well known 
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 company, as SAS Braathens struggles, the public often also gets affected. Problems with 
operational difficulties and internal conflicts have resulted in delays and cancellations, and 
media has not been late to report about that. Another factor, which might have contributed to 
the negativity from the media towards SAS Braathens, was when SAS employees used tip off 
media whenever something happened.       
 
For the employees, who already struggled with their situation, it cannot have been 
encouraging for them to read all the negative things that have been written about their 
employer in the newspapers. Another set back can have been that the customers have got too 
influenced by the media and what has been said about SAS Braathens, that they choose not to 
fly with them.      
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 7.0 Conclusions and Discussion 
Even if SAS Braathens had the basic conditions to succeed in that they were related 
companies, and they managed to create some synergies, they failed in doing so.  In many 
aspects it seems that the merger was not well planned, but rushed into without any clear 
guidelines. There has been a lack of information throughout the whole integration process, 
which has created insecurity and frustration among the employees. By not telling their 
employees about the merger, but letting them read about it in the newspaper that SAS and 
Braathens were going to merge, exemplifies the poor information.  
 
The biggest problems in SAS Braathens have been the management and the politics. The 
management has not had an open dialog with their employees and it seems that they have not 
really cared about the integration among the employees. All the problems with the internal 
politics, regarding the seniority list, and the problems the SAS Group has had before with 
Linjeflyg and SAS Commuter, should have been solved during the first phase of the 
integration to facilitate the rest of the process. As it is now, the employees have felt frustration 
and anger.  
 
It was two very different companies that merged, with two vastly different organization 
cultures. Even if culture has not been the big issue for the unsuccessful integration, it has 
played a role. With no communication and no help to integrate the cultures, it has been more 
or less up to the employees to take care of themselves. This has, of course, created a bad 
atmosphere, since people like to have it the way they are used to. If there had been more 
openness during the merger and the integration, the outcome might have looked different. 
With a clear plan of how the integration should have been conducted, and help, such as social 
activities, to integrate the employees, many of the internal conflicts could have been avoided 
and the external relations might have looked different.  
 
In an industry such as the airline industry, there is fierce competition. SAS Braathens, 
struggle does not seem to have affected the relation to Norwegian Air Shuttle. Since 
Norwegian Air Shuttle was established after the SAS Group’s acquisition of Braathens, the 
market structure has not changed with the merger. The direct affect SAS Braathens has had on 
Norwegian Air Shuttle is that Norwegian Air Shuttle has increased their customer base during 
strikes, but when the strikes were solved, they lost most of them again. 
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 From our findings, it is hard to draw conclusion on how an M&A that struggles affect their 
competitors. Logically, the competitors would gain if the focal firm was struggling. In SAS 
Braathens case, the company has received negative publicity, which the competitors could 
take advantage of. This might be hard in Norway though, because of the way the industry 
looks, and with few competitors. In another country, in the international air industry, or in 
another industry the results might have looked different, with a greater affect on the 
competitors.  
 
The customers have been negatively affected by the SAS Braathens merger. The internal 
struggles have led to internal conflicts, strikes, delays, and cancellations. For customers who 
have booked a flight ticket, and then, when arriving at the airport finds out that the flight has 
been delayed/cancelled, get frustrated. Several customers have said that they will never fly 
with SAS Braathens again, but most of them do. This can be explained by the restricted 
selection of companies the customers have to choose between, the infrastructure of Norway 
with large distances, and the lack of satisfactory substitutes. Even if the customers in Southern 
Norway have substitutes to choose between, the time they save by using the airplane is 
substantial.  
 
An M&A that struggles will most likely affect their relationship to the customers, if the 
struggling affects them. In industries with undifferentiated products, the customer can easily 
change supplier if they are not satisfied with the service and quality. In the airline industry, 
the customers are affected by delays and cancellations, and with the fierce competition that 
exists in this industry, the customers can relatively easily change company (not in Norway).  
 
The relationship to the media might also be affected. In the SAS Braathens case, the media 
has had a negative view on the merger. Whenever something goes wrong, the media is 
relatively quick to report. It is hard to determine exactly how much of the negative publicity 
that has to do directly with the merger, and how much depends on SAS’s earlier relationship 
to the media, and the fact that SAS Braathens is government-owned, and can be seen as a 
monopoly in some situations. Because of this, we cannot draw certain conclusions that an 
M&A that struggles always will affect the media negatively, however, it is likely, especially if 
it is a big company and the struggling affects the public. 
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 Appendix 1 
 
Date 
 
 
 
 
 
U.S. Aviation Gasoline Retail Sales 
by All R&G (Cents per Gallon) 
1976  
1977  
1978 51,6 
1979 68,9 
1980 108,4 
1981 130,3 
1982 131,2 
1983 125,5 
1984 123,4 
1985 120,1 
1986 101,1 
1987 90,7 
1988 89,1 
1989 99,5 
1990 112 
1991 104,7 
1992 102,7 
1993 99 
1994 95,7 
1995 100,5 
1996 111,6 
1997 112,8 
1998 97,5 
1999 105,9 
2000 130,6 
2001 132,3 
2002 128,8 
2003 149,3 
2004 181,9 
2005 223,1 
2006 268,2 
Last Updated 04/10/2007 - = No Data Reported;  -- = Not Applicable;  NA = Not Available;  W = Withheld to 
avoid disclosure of individual company data. 
(Energy Information Administration, 2007) 
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 Appendix 2 
 
The SAS Group's business areas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(SAS Group, 2007) 
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 Appendix 3 
 
 
 
Frequency and traffic on main routes to/from Oslo by airline in 2005 
 
 
Destination Antall frekvenser primo mars 2006 Trafikk 2005 Norwegians andel av: 
 
                 Norwegian      SAS Braathens Total 1000 pax Frekvens 06 Trafikk 05
  
 
Totalt  33  106  139 7335   24 24  
 
(Denstadli et al., 2006) 
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 Appendix 4 
 
 
 
 
 
441 Passasjerer ved norske flyplasser, etter rutetype og destinasjon 
 I alt Ruteflyging Charterflyging 
 I alt Innenlands trafikk 
Utenlands 
trafikk I alt 
Innenlands 
trafikk 
Utenlands 
trafikk I alt 
Innenlands 
trafikk 
Utenlands 
trafikk 
2003 30 109 335 20 931 797 9 177 538 28 277 426 20 844 498 7 432 928 1 831 909 87 299 1 744 610
2004 31 104 742 21 415 220 9 689 522 29 256 803 21 312 401 7 944 402 1 847 939 102 819 1 745 120
2005 34 803 987 22 989 577 11 814 410 32 647 942 22 849 063 9 798 879 2 156 045 140 514 2 015 531
 
(Statistics Norway, 2006) 
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